Overfishing in the Philippine marine fisheries sector : a disaggregated analysis; final report by Israel, Danilo C. & Banzon, Cesar P.
OVERFISHING IN THE PHILIPPINE 
MARINE FISHERIES SECTOR: 




DANILO C. ISRAEL 
Research Fellow 
Philippine Institute for Development Studies 
and 
CESAR P. BANZON 
Research Associate 
Philippine Institute for Development Studies 
Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia 
(EEPSEA) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES 






. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
INTRODUCTION .. . . .... .. ..... ... ... ... ... ... . . . . . .... .. . .. .. . . I 
1.1. Overview of the Philippine Fisheries Sector . ...... . ............... 1 
1.2 Overfishing in the Marine Fisheries . . .. .. ...... .. .. .. . . ... ... ... 4 
1.3 Research Gaps . .. ...... . ....... .. .. .. ....... . . ... . . ... .. .. .. 9 
1.4 Objectives of the Paper . .. .... ..... .. . ...... ... . . ... . . .... . ... 9 
1.5 Sources of Data and Information ... .. ........ . ... .. . .. ..... . .. . I 0 
1.6 Organization of the Paper . . ..... . .... ....... . . . .. . .. . ... . .... 11 
THEORETICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
THE BASIC THEORY OF MARINE RESOURCE OVERFJSHING . . . . 12 
2.1 Kinds of Overfishing ........ . .. ... ... ..... . . . .. . . ....... .. . . 12 
2.2 Biological Theory of Overfishing .. . . .. ..... . .... ............. . 13 
2.3 Economic Theory of Overfishing ........ . .... . . . .. .. .......... 18 
III MODELS OF MARINE OVERFISHING ..... . ..... .. ....... . . ..... 22 
3.1 Single Species and Constant Price Models ....... .. . .. .... ....... 22 
3.1.1 The Basic Gordon-Schaefer Model .... .... ... .. . . . .. .. . 22 
3.1.2 The Basic Fox Model . ..... . .......... ... ........... . .. 27 
3.2 Single Species and Variable Price Models ...... . . . .............. 30 
3.2.1 The Modified Gordon-Schaefer Model ... ... .... . ... . .... . 30 
3.2.2 The Modified Fox Model . . . .... . ...... . ...... . . . ... . ... 34 
3.3 Multiple Species and Fixed Price Models . .. . . . ........ . . . . .... .. 36 
3.4 Multiple Species and Variable Prices Models .. ... ...... . ... ... . . . 38 
3.5 Other Models . .. .. .... ...... ... ... .. ...... ...... . ..... ..... 41 
IV REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON OVERFISHING .. . 42 
4.1 Empirical Studies on Overfishing in the Philippines .. . . .... . . .... .. 42 
4.1.1 The Dalzell et al. Study ..... . .... . . . .... . . . ..... .. .... . 42 
4.1.2 The Trinidad et al. Study .. . . . .... . . . ... .. . .. ...... .. . .. 44 
4.1.3 The Padilla and De Guzman Study ... .. . . . . . . . . . ... .. .. .. 45 
4.1.4 The Silvestre and Pauly Study .. .......... . . . ... . . . . . . . .. 46 
4.1.5 The Schatz Study . ... . ....... .. ... ... ... ............. . 47 
4.2 Empirical Studies on Overfishing in Southeast Asia ................ 48 
4.2.1 The Panayotou and Jetanavanich Study ... ............... .. 48 
V REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS FOR CONTROLLING 
OVERFISHING ................. . ............ . . ........... ...... 50 
5.1 Regulatory Instruments for Controlling Overfishing .... ..... ..... .. 50 
5.1.1 Taxation .. ............... .. .. ......... ........... . .. 50 
5.1.1.1 Tax on Catch ........ .. ... ... ...... .. .. ... ..... 50 
5.1.1.2 Tax on Effort ................... .. ......... .... 51 
5.1.1.3 Taxation as a Whole . ...... ............ . ........ 52 
5 .1.2 Licencing .............. .. .................... . ....... 52 
5.1.3 Individual Fish Quota ..... ..... ... ....... ............. . 54 
5.1.4 Overall Quota ............................ .... ......... 55 
5.1.5 Gear Restrictions ... ... ................................ 56 
5.1.6 Mesh Size Limitation ... .... ...... ..... . .. ..... .... . .... 56 
5.1.7 Closed Seasons . ... .... .... ..... ..... ....... ....... .... 57 
5.1.8 Closed Areas .......... ... .... ..... ........ ......... .. 58 
VI REVIEW OF FISHERIES ADMINISTRATION, GOVERNING LAWS 
AND USE OF REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS .................... 59 
6.1 Brief History of Fishery Administration in the Philippines ......... .. 59 
6.2 Brief History of Fisheries laws in the Philippines .. .. ............. . 60 
6.3 Review on the Use of Regulatory Instruments . ................... 61 
VII SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .... .... ....... ..... .. 64 
PART II EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION 
VIII EMPIRICAL MODELS AND THE CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC RENT ...... 67 
8.1 Overall Description and Assumptions of the Models ................. . 67 
8.2 The Concept of Economic Rent ..... . ... .......... ............... 68 
IX MARINE FISHERIES DATA FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS .. . ....... 70 
9.1. Data for Commercial Fisheries . .................. . . . .......... 70 
9.1.1 Data Sources for Commercial Fisheries .................... 70 
9 .1.2 Catch in the Commercial Fisheries, 1948-87 ........ .... ... 70 
9 .1.3 Engine Horsepower in the Commercial Fisheries, 1948-87 . .. . 70 
9.1.4 Catch in the Commercial Fisheries, 1988-94 ................ 73 
9.1.5 Engine Horsepower in the Commercial Fisheries, 1988-94 .... 76 
9.1.6 Labor Horsepower in the Commercial Fisheries, 1948-94 . .... 76 
9.1.7 Learning Effects Adjusted Horsepower in the Commercial 
Fisheries, 1948-94 .... ...... .... .......... .... ........ 79 
9.1.8 Carrier Fleet Horsepower in the Commercial 
Fisheries, 1948-94 ................ .. ..... .. .......... . 79 
9.1.9 Total Learning Adjusted Horsepower in the Commercial 
Fisheries, 1948-94 ..... . ........... . ...... ... . ... ..... 83 
9 .1.1 0 Standardization of Fishing Effort Based on Purse Seine 
Efficiency .. ... ........................ . .......... .. . 83 
9.1.11 Adjusted Catch, Effort and Catch/Effort in the Commercial 
Fisheries, 1948-94 . . . .. . . . ... .. .. . . ... . .. ..... . ... . ... 83 
9.1.12 Adjusted Catch, Effort and Catch/Effort for Purse Seine 
and Other Commercial Gears, 1948-94 ......... . . . ....... 90 
9 .1.13 Prices of Fish Catch and Cost of Fishing Effort in the 
Commercial Fisheries, 1994 90 
9.2 Data for Municipal Fisheries . .. ..... . ... ... ... . ... ..... . . . ... . 90 
9.2.1 Data Sources for Municipal Fisheries ..................... 90 
9 .2.2 Catch in the Municipal Fisheries, 1948-94 ................. 90 
9.2.3 Adjustment in the Municipal Fisheries Catch Data ...... ..... 98 
9.2.4 Effort in the Municipal Fisheries, 1948-94 .. .. ............. 98 
9.2.5 Adjustment in the Municipal Fishing Effort Data ..... .. ..... 98 
9 .2.6 Prices of Fish Catch and Cost of Fishing Effort in the 
Municipal Fisheries, 1994 ..................... . . .. ... . . 98 
9.3 Data for Total Marine Fisheries . .. ............. . ........ . ... . . . 98 
9.3.1 Data for Total Marine Fisheries Catch and Effort, 1948-94 .... 98 
9.3 .2 Data for the Marine Fisheries Catch, by Species, 1976-87 .... 101 
9.3.3 Prices of Fish Catch and Cost of Fishing Effort in the 
Marine Fisheries, 1994 .... .. ...... . ... . . ... ......... . . 101 
X RESULTS OF ESTIMATION ........................ . ..... ... .. . 106 
10.1 Results for Commercial Fisheries . .. ...... .. .. . ... . ...... . .... 106 
1 0.1.1 Estimation of the GS and Fox Models for Commercial 
Fisheries . . ... .. . .... . .. . . .... ... . . . . ............... 1 06 
1 0.1.2 Maximum Sustainable, Maximum Economic and Open Access 
Levels in Commercial Fisheries .... . . . .................. 106 
1 0.1 .3 Economic Rent in Commercial Fisheries ......... ... .. . .. 106 
1 0.1.4 Required Reduction of Fishing Effort in Commercial 
Fisheries .. . . .. ................. . . . ... . . ... . . . . . . .. Ill 
10.1.5 Estimation ofthe GS and Fox Models for Purse Seine and 
Other Commercial Fishing Gears . .... .. ..... . ... . ... . .. Ill 
10.2 Results for Municipal Fisheries ...... .. ..... .. ..... ..... . . . .. . 113 
1 0.2.1 Estimation of the GS and Fox Models for Municipal Fisheries 113 
1 0.2.2 Maximum Sustainable, Maximum Economic and Open Access 
Levels in Municipal Fisheries . . . . ..... . ..... . . ... . . .... 113 
1 0.2.3 Economic Rent in Municipal Fisheries . ... .... .. . .... . . .. 113 
1 0.2.4 Required Reduction of Fishing Effort in Municipal Fisheries . . 118 
10.3 Results for Overall Marine Fisheries . ... ... . .. . ......... ....... 118 
10.3.1 Estimation ofthe GS and Fox Models for Overall Marine 
Fisheries ...... ..... .... .. .... .... .. ........ .... ... . 118 
10.3.2 Maximum Sustainable, Maximum Economic and Open Access 
Levels in Overall Marine Fisheries ....... ... ..... ....... 118 
10.3.3 Economic Rent in Overall Marine Fisheries ............... 122 
10.3.4 Required Reduction of Fishing Effort in Overall Marine 
Fisheries ........ .. ..... .. ........... ... ...... .. . ... 122 
10.4 Results for Individual Fish Species in Marine Fisheries ........ .. .. 122 
10.5 Employment Impacts ofReduction in Effort in Marine Fisheries ..... 127 
XI CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .. .. .......... . ...... 130 
11.1 Conclusions . ..... ..... ... ... ..... .. ..... . ................ 130 
11.2 Recommendations . .... ............................. .... ... 131 
11.2.1 Recommendations for Commercial Fisheries .. ........... 131 
11.2.2 Recommendations for Municipal Fisheries ............... 133 
11.2.3 Recommendations for Overall Marine Fisheries ... . ........ 134 
REFERENCES 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table No. Title Page No. 
Quantity (Metric Tons) and FOB Value (Million Pesos) ofFish Production in the 
Philippines, by Sector 2 
2 Quantity (Metric Tons) and FOB Value (Million Pesos) of Exports and Imports 
of Fishery by the Philippines 5 
3 Fishing Effort and Catch Per Unit Effort for Small Pelagic and Demersal Fish 
Species in the Philippines, 1965-1985 6 
4 Sources of Data for Commercial Fisheries, 1948-1994 71 
5 Catch in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1948-1987 (Metric Tons) 72 
6 Engine Horsep?wer in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1948-1987 74 
I 7 Catch in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1988-1994 (Metric Tons) 75 
I 
8 Estimated engine Horsepower in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1988-1994 77 
9 Computation of Ratio of Labor Horsepower to engine Horsepower in the Philippine 
I 
Commercial Fisheries 78 
10 Engine and Labor Horsepower in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1948-1994 80 
11 Learning Factors in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1948-1994 81 
12 Learning Effects Adjusted Horsepower in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 
1948-1994 82 
13 Carrier Engine and Labor Horsepower in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 
1948-1994 84 
14 Learning Adjusted Carrier Horsepower in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 
1948-1994 85 
15 Learning Adjusted Total Horsepower in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 
1948-1994 86 
I 16 Unadjusted Catch, Effort and Catch/Effort in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 
1948-1994 87 
I 17 Regression Results for Catch/Effort in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 
1965-1994 88 
I 18 Final Catch, Effort and Catch/Effort of Purse Seine and Other Gears, 1948-1994 89 
I 19 Unadjusted Catch, Effort and Catch/Effort of Purse Seine and Other Gears, 1948-1987 91 
20 Regression Results for Catch/Effort and Effort for Purse Seine, 1965-1994 92 
21 Final Catch, Effort and catch/Effort of Purse Seine and Other Gears, 1948-1987 93 
I 22 Average Market Wholesale Prices of Commercial Fish Species, 1994 94 
I 23 Estimated Cost of Fishing Effort, 1988-1994 95 
24 Sources of Data for Municipal Fisheries, 1948-1994 96 
I 25 Catch, Effort ~d Catch/effort in the Philippine Municipal Fisheries, 1948-1994 97 
I 26 Average Market Wholesale Price of Popular Municipal Fish species, 1994 99 
I 
27 Catch, Effort and A Catch/Effort in the Philippine Marine Fisheries, 1948-1994 100 
28 Catch of Specific Species in the Philippine Marine Fisheries, 1976-1987 102 
I 29 Average Market Wholesale Price of Marine Fish Species, 1994 105 
I 
30 Regression Results for Gordon-Schaefer and Fox Models in the Philippine 
Commercial Fisheries, 1948-1994 107 
I 31 Key Indicators Using the Gordon-Schaefer Model Results in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1994 108 
I 32 Estimated Total Revenues and Total Costs at Different Levels of Effort in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries Based on the Gordon-Schaefer Model 109 
I 33 Regression Results for the Gordon-Schaefer and Fox Models for Purse Seine and Other Gears, 1948-1994 112 





35 Key Indicators Using the Gordon-Schaefer Model Results in the Philippines 
Municipal Fisheries, 1994 
36 Estimated Total Revenues and Total Costs at Different Levels of Effort in the 
Philippine Municipal Fisheries Based on the Gordon-Schaefer Model 
37 Regression Results for the Gordon-Schaefer and Fox Models in the Philippine 
Marine Fisheries, 1948-1994 
38 Key Indicators Using the Gordon-Schaefer Model Results in the Philippine 
Marine Fisheries, 1994 
39 Estimated Total Revenues and Total Costs at Different Levels of Effort in the 
Philippine Marine Fisheries Board on the Gordon-Schaefer Model 
40 
41 
Regression Results for the Gordon-Schaefer and Fox Models in the Philippine 
Marine Fisheries, Top Species, 1976-1987 









LIST OF FIGURES 




Distribution of Employment in the Fishery Sector, 1990 3 
Total Fishing Effort for Small Pelagic and Demersal Fishes, 1965-1985 7 2 
3 Catch Per Unit Effort for Small Pelagic and Demersal Fishes, 1965-1985 8 
4 Relationship Between Growth ofFish Population (r) and Fish Stock (P) 14 
5 Relationship Between Fish Stock (P) and Fishing Effort (E) 15 
6 Relationship Between Fish Catch (Y) and Fishing Effort (E) 16 
7 Relationship Between Catch Per Unit of Effort and Fishing Effort 17 
I 
8 Total Revenue and Cost Curves and Cost Functions 19 
9 Marginal and Average Revenue Cost Curves 20 
I 10 Comparison of the Relationships Between Catch, CPUE and Effort in 
the Gordon-Schaefer and Fox Models 31 
I 11 A Variable Price Schaefer Model Indicating the Maximum Economic 
Yields (MEY), the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), Monopoly 
I Position and Bioeconomic Equilibrium (BE) Under Open Access 35 
12 Catch Curves for a Multiple Species Fishing 39 
13 The Gordon-Schaefer Model and Maximum Economic Rent in Marine Fisheries 69 
14 Results of the Estimation of the Gordon-Schaefer Model for the Commercial 
Fisheries, 1948-1994 110 
15 Results of the Estimation on the Gordon-Schaefer Model for the Municipal 
Fisheries, 1948-1994 117 
16 Results of the Estimation of the Gordon-Schaefer Model for the Overall 








Results of past studies indicated that the marine fisheries of the Philippines are already 
seriously overfished. The analyses conducted by the studies, however, were based on groupings 
of fish species. Moreover, the evaluation was conducted in an aggregated manner and did not 
study overfishing by specific economic sector or fish species. 
The study investigated overfishing by looking into the problem by economic sector, i.e . 
commercial, municipal and overall marine fisheries; by gear, i.e. purse seine and other gears; and 
for 35 economically important marine species. The evaluation employed the Gordon-Schaefer 
(GS) and Fox models of marine overfishing and assumed single-species and multiple-species 
fisheries and constant prices for fish catch and fishing effort. 
In addition, the study reviewed the economic theory and models of marine overfishing, 
empirical studies on overfishing, regulatory instruments to contain overfishing and experiences 
in local fishery administration. Aside from presenting background information, the reviews were 
intended to discuss management options for containing the overfishing problem. 
Consistent with past works, the study found that overfishing exists in the commercial and 
municipal fisheries, individually, and in the marine fishery sector as a whole. Results also showed 
that if operated at optilnallevels, the marine fisheries will generate substantial economic rents. 
For the overall marine fisheries, in particular, maximum economic rent of about P19.69 billion 
per year can be had at the maximum economic yield level. 
The study further found that overexploitation does not exist only at the sectoral stage but 
also at the gear and species levels. Purse seine and other gears were shown to operate beyond 
optimal levels while several of the marine fish species were likewise found to be overfished. 
To attain sustainable levels in marine fisheries, results of the study indicated that 
substantial reductions in fishing effort must be made. Specifically, for overall marine fisheries, 
fishing effort need to be lowered by about 65 percent to attain economic efficiency and by 
approximately 35 percent to generate biological sustainability. It was estimated that these 
reductions will mean that many fishermen, from about a quarter to half a million, will lose their 
fishery livelihood. 
Based on the results of analysis, the study recommended that fishing effort in the marine 
fisheries must be decreased. To do so, options were considered, including raising the present 
rates for the license scheme or through direct fixing of the maximum amount of fishing effort that 
will be tolerated. Over the long term, however, the study suggested that a new management 
approach similar to the Individual Tradable Quota system being successfully employed in New 














On the potential employment impacts of reduction of fishing effort, the study suggested 
that a balance between efficiency and equity considerations must be exercised. Among others, 
those who will be displaced must be afforded assistance by the government in terms of skills 
training for gainful employment elsewhere and the provision of alternative employment. 
ii 
OVERFISHING IN THE PIDLIPPINE MARINE FISHERIES SECTOR: 
A DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS 
I 
by 






1.1 . Overview of the Philippine Fisheries Sector 
The Philippine fisheries sector is a significant contributor to the national economy. Total 
output of the sector approximately comprises five percent of the Gross National Product. 
Furthermore, fisheries · production meets more than two-thirds of national animal protein 
consumption (Guerrero 1989; BAR 1991). 
A brief review of production performance shows a stead~ growth of the fisheries sector over 
time (Table 1). From 1981 to 1994, the sector posted an annual average growth rate of3.30 percent, 
in terms of quantity, and 15.84 percent, in terms of value of production. Among the four subsectors, 
aquaculture and commercial fisheries grew the fastest, in quantity terms, while municipal marine 
fisheries and inland fisheries increased the slowest. In both quantity and value terms, aquaculture 
rose the fastest. 
It was estimated that the fisheries sector employs about a million fishermen and fishfarmers 
(BF AR 1991 ). Of this number, 36 percent were in municipal marine fisheries, 29 percent were in 
commercial fisheries, 27 percent were in aquaculture and 8 percent were in inland fisheries (Figure 
1). Hence, the municipal marine fisheries was the most important subsector in terms of employment 
but commercial fisheries and aquaculture were not far behind. 
1Ph.D. in Natural Resource Economics/Research Fellow and Former Research Associate, respectively, of 
the Philippine Institute for Development Studies, NEDA sa Makati Bldg., 106 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati 
1200, Metro Manila, Philippines. This research has been funded by the Economy and Environment Program for 
Southeast Asia (EEPSEA). 
-
Table1: Quantity (Thousand MT) and FOB Value (Million P) of Flah Production In the Philippine•, by Sector. 1981·94 
Municipal Inland 
All Sectors Commercial Marine Aquaculture Rshing 
Year Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value , 
1981 1,774 13,955 495 4,125 710 6,264 340 2,866 229 700 
1982 1,896 15,064 526 4,355 708 6,488 392 3,393 270 828 
1983 2,110 18,982 519 4,643 771 7,463 445 4,799 375 2,077 
1984 2,080 25,650 513 6,521 790 10,291 478 7,266 299 1,572 
1985 2,052 31,297 512 7,857 785 12,796 495 8,724 260 1,920 
1986 2,089 37,331 546 9,248 807 14,611 471 10,832 265 2,640 
1987 2,213 37,350 591 9,821 816 14,217 561 11,421 245 1,891 
1988 2,270 42,118 600 10,272 838 14,693 600 15,213 232 1,940 
1989 2,371 45,094 637 11 ,033 883 16,182 629 15,673 222 2,206 
1990 2,504 · 52,177 701 12,411 895 16,736 671 20,466 237 2,564 
1991 2,599 60,034 760 15,245 914 19,614 692 22,656 233 2,519 
1992 2,826 65,443 805 16,801 855 19,444 736 25,986 230 3,212 
1993 2,647 71 ,056 845 18,365 803 20,118 772 30,508 227 2,067 
1994 2,686 81,229 883 21,130 787 22,327 791 35,280 223 2,492 
Ave. Annual 
Growth Rate(%) 3.30 14.64 4.62 13.76 0.88 10.77 6.87 22.01 0 .69 16.87 
(\.) 




Figure 1. Distribution of Employment in the Fishery Sector, 1990 
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It has been estimated also that when all backward and forward linkages are considered, about 
12 percent of the total population of the Philippines were in one way or another dependent on 
fisheries related activities for their livelihood (Trinidad et al. 1993). 
Finally, the fisheries sector has been a steady dollar earner for the country. In recent years, 
in particular, the exports of fisheries products have been growing at very high rates annually, 
especially in value terms (Table 2). While this was so, however, the imports of fishery products 
have been growing as well, and at even greater rates than do exports. Thus, in general, the country 
has been recording negative net exports over time, in quantity terms, although in value terms, it has 
been posting positive net exports. 
1.2 Overfishing in the Marine Fisheries 
Although the performance of the fisheries sector statistically looks impressive in terms of 
production, there has been a serious downside to it. Specifically, it has been argued that its marine 
component has been overfished already. It is feared that if the current marine fishing rate goes 
unabated, the marine fisheries can collapse as edible fish populations diminish and fish species are 
driven to near extinction. 
Some local empirical economic studies on overfishing at the national level have been 
conducted and they suggest the acuteness of the overfishing problem in the marine fisheries (e.g. 
Silvestre and Pauly 1987; Dalzell et al. 1987; Trinidad et al. 1993; Padilla and De Guzman 1994). 
In summary, these studies indicated that the catch per unit effort (CPUE) in demersal, or bottom 
dwelling species, and small pelagic, or surface dwelling species, has been falling over the years, 
implying overfishing in these groupings of species. 
The marine overfishing problem is illustrated in Table 3. In the past decades, the CPUE has 
steadily fallen so that by 1984, it was only approximately a third of the 1965 figures, for both small 
pelagic and demersal species. In contrast, effort spent on fishing has increased to greater than five 
times the 1965 levels. Evidently, then, while more and more effort has been dedicated in catching 
fish, the yield from fishing per unit of effort expended has been fast declining. 
A graphical presentation of the situation, in Figures 2 and 3, however, shows that there were 
actually years when fishing effort declined. For small pelagic species, fishing effort decreased in the 
late sixties, early seventies, mid-seventies and mid-eighties. For the demersal species, effort fell in 
middle and late seventies. While this was so, on the other hand, there is no mistaking that the overall 
general trend of fishing effort has been increasing over the whole period. 
A similar case can be observed for the catch per unit effort. As can be seen, the CPUE for 
small pelagic species had increased in the early and late seventies while that for demersal species 
had risen in the late sixties and middle seventies. Again, however, the overall trend of the CPUE has 




Table 2: Quantity (MT) and FOB Value (Million P) of Exports and Imports of Fishery Products by the Philippines, 
1981-94 
Net 
Exports Imports Exports 
Year Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value 
1981 83,736 1,251 46,850 288 36,886 963 
1982 68,265 1,120 83,445 444 (15,180) 676 
1983 75,589 1,593 23,038 111 52,551 1,482 
1984 63,055 2,179 6,097 50 56,958 2,129 
1985 95,077 3,496 28,755 118 66,322 3,378 
1986 101,453 4,883 69,085 386 32,368 4,497 
1987 111,830 6,442 104,936 637 6,894 5,805 
1988 128,903 9,599 164,575 1,312 (35,672) 8,287 
1989 145,099 10,248 197,966 1,424 (52,867) .8,824 
1990 143,038 11,529 196,115 1,854 (53,077) 9,675 
1991 144,939 14,048 193,635 2,323 (48,696) 11,725 
1992 131,915 11,090 221,545 2,496 (89,630) 8,594 
1993 163,745 14,074 208,895 2,249 (45,150) 11,825 
1994 172,080 15,027 241,194 2,505 (69,114) 12,522 
Ave. Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 7.03 23.33 45.77 40.87 -41.90 26.99 
----------· --- ------ ---- ---- -- -- -- --- - ------------ --
Source: BAS. "Selected Fisheries Statistics". 
I 
Table 3: Fishing Effort and Catch Per Unit Effort for Small Pelagic and Demersal 
Fish Species in the Philippines, 1965-85 
Small 
Pelagics Demersals 
Effort CPUE Effort CPUE 
Year ('000 Hp) (Mt/Hp/yr ('000 Hp) (Mt/Hp/yr) 
1965 105 2.50 182 1.13 
1966 194 2.00 203 1.09 
1967 210 1.55 264 0.20 
1968 203 1.76 337 0.89 
1969 166 2.11 431 0.65 
1970 157 2.69 494 0.56 
1971 155 2.93 536 0.53 
1972 313 2.08 610 0.54 
1973 292 1.74 676 0.51 
1974 280 1.82 718 0.52 
1975 266 1.94 653 0.46 
1976 259 2.01 524 0.69 
1977 280 2.03 509 0.73 
1978 363 1.64 534 0.68 
1979 416 1.20 534 0.68 
1980 371 1.21 677 0.55 
1981 491 1.13 677 0.47 
1982 625 0.92 777 0.47 
1983 621 0.85 946 0.40 
1984 557 0.84 976 0.42 
1985 558 0.84 - -
Ave. Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 11 .93 -4.07 10.04 10.83 















Source of basic data: Table 3 . 
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1.3 Research Gaps 
Although studies have been conducted, there remain some research gaps related to 
overfishing in the marine fisheries sector which need to be addressed. For instance, an important 
limitation of past studies is that all were based on groupings of species, i.e. small pelagic and 
demersal fisheries. This approach may render the studies less useful for actual fisheries management 
and policy-making which are oftentimes sector-based, i.e. commercial fisheries and municipal 
fisheries. 
Another important limitation of past studies is that they used throughout the assumption of 
a single or composite fish species in fisheries. Although this provides a beginning in analyzing 
overfishing, there is the need for a more disaggregated type of analysis, e.g. in terms of specific 
species. A third limitation of previous studies is that the social costs of a possible reduction in 
fishing effort to improve the management of resources, especially unemployment impacts of a 
reduction in fishing effort among fishermen, have not been considered. Yet, unemployment in a 
developing economy like the Philippines has always been of major consideration in policy-making. 
1.4 Objectives of the Paper 
The overall objective of this work is to investigate the issue of overfishing in the marine 
fisheries of the Philippines using a sectoral and disaggregated approach. 
This effort is divided into two parts: the theoretical and institutional analysis (Part I) and the 
empirical estimation (Part II). The specific objectives of the theoretical and institutional analysis 
are as follows : 
a) to review the basic theory of marine resource overfishing; 






to review the different empirical economic literature on overfishing at the national 
level in the Philippines and Southeast Asia; 
to review the different regulatory instruments useful for containing the overfishing 
problem; 
to review Philippine fisheries administration over time including the institutions and 
laws governing fisheries; 










g) to provide recommendations on how to analyze the overfishing problem in the 
marine fisheries sector. 
The purpose of the review of the theory, models and literature is to develop analytical models 
which can be applied for empirical estimation. The review of regulatory instruments is done to get 
a better understanding of instruments and to determine which can be potentially applied to curve 
overfishing. The review of fishery institution and government experience with regulatory 
instruments is intended to get a picture of overall fishery administration vis a vis the government 
function as preserver of fisheries resources. The last objective provides the basis for doing the 
second part of the study. 
The second part of this endeavor has the following objectives: 
a) to construct time-series data on the parameters useful for the estimation of marine 
fisheries overfishing both at sectoral, i.e. commercial and municipal fisheries and 
overall marine fisheries, and disaggregated, i.e. individual gears and species, levels 
using secondary data; 





to determine the biologically and economically optimal levels of exploitation in the 
commercial, municipal and overall marine fisheries; 
to measure the maximum economic rent that can be generated from the commercial, 
municipal and overall marine fisheries; 
to measure the employment impacts of reduction in fishing effort in the commercial, 
municipal and overall marine fisheries; and 
to discuss the conclusions and provide some recommendations for the future 
conservation and development of the commercial, municipal and overall marine 
fisheries. 
The second part of the paper is the central outcome of the study. Objectives (a) to (e) 
provides the findings that will be used to address objective (f) of the second part. 
1.5 Sources of Data and Information 
The sources of information for Part I are available literature on fishery institutions and 
theoretical and empirical literature on regulatory instruments and marine overfishing. 
The theoretical literature on the regulatory instruments and on marine overfishing include 











on overfishing are articles dealing on Phi lippine and Southeast Asian experience on the problem, 
specifically at the national level. 
The institutional sources of the review materials for Part I were libraries of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), International Center for Living Aquatic Resource Management 
(ICLARM), University of the Philippines, Diliman Campus (UP Diliman), Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources 
(BF AR). These institutions are located in Metro Manila. 
For the second part of the work, the sources of data are the published indeces and 
unpublished files of the BF AR and the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics (BAS), which are under the 
Department of Agriculture (DA). These data sources and the data set generated will be discussed 
in more detail in Part II. 
1.6 Organization of the Paper 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the first part, the economic theory of 
overfishing was discussed in Chapter 2 while overfishing models were reviewed in Chapter 3. In 
Chapter 4, empirical studies undertaken on overfishing were discussed while in chapter 5, the 
ditTerent regulatory instruments for containing the overfishing problem were reviewed. Chapter 6 
discussed Philippine fishery institutions and laws and the experience in the utilization of regulatory 
instruments. The conclusions and recommendations of Part I were provided in Chapter 7. 
In the second part, Chapter 8 discussed the empirical models used. Then, in Chapter 9, the 
data and methods for constructing the data were presented in detail. The results of the empirical 
estimation were shown in Chapter 10. The last chapter provided the conclusions and 
recommendations of Part I. 
II 
I 
PART I: THEORETICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
CHAPTER II 
THE BASIC THEORY OF MARINE RESOURCE OVERFISHING 
Basically, there are two ways that overfishing can occur. The first is when fishermen employ 
excessive effort, in terms of time and other production inputs spent on fishing. The second is when 
they use destructive fishing gears and methods. 
Both causes of overfishing can deplete the fisheries stock to dangerous levels over a given 
time. However, the current empirical literature generally emphasize only on excessive fishing effort 
as subject of analysis. An important constraint to an evaluation of destructive gears and methods 
is the difficulty encountered in generating information on the issue. Due to the illegal nature of 
destructive gears and methods in many countries, documentation of the actual levels of use and 
resource damage related to them has been virtually non-existent. This effort, then, follows tradition 
and concentrates only on the issue of overfishing in fisheries due to excessive fishing effort as the 
subject of analysis. 
2.1 Kinds of Overfishing 
Whether due to the employment of excessive fishing effort or use of destructive gears and 
techniques, however, overfishing can be classified in general into different categories (Pauly 1987). 
One form of overfishing is growth overfishing which occurs when the fish are caught even before 
they have a chance to grow. Here, too young fish are gathered below the required age for harvest. 
Another type of overfishing is recruitment overfishing where the adult fish population is 
caught in large numbers so that fish reproduction is gravely impaired. The third kind of overfishing 
is ecosystem overfishing which happens when the decline in a once abundant fish stock due to 
fishing is not compensated for by an increase in the stocks of other species. Finally, the fourth kind 
of overfishing is economic which occurs when increases in fishing effort leads to profit levels which 
are below maximum. 
Of the above types of overfishing, economic overfishing may be of most interest to fishery 
managers and planners. This is because the fisheries sector is primarily viewed by the society as an 
economic sector, i.e. food and income generating sector. As such, any disruption in the fisheries 
sector is eventually analyzed in terms of how much it impacts on the economic welfare of sectoral 












2.2 Biological Theory of Overfishing 
While economic overfishing is what may concern the fishery managers and planners, the 
theory of overfishing actually commences with biological, and not economic, concepts. These 
biological concepts are reviewed below. 
The basic biological story starts with the notion of a fishery resource, the sea, that is owned 
by no one and whose exploitation is open to everyone. Before the entrance of man into the fishery, 
the stock offish, P, in the fishery grows at a net natural rate, r, between two time periods (Figure 
4). This growth rate is equal to the recruitment of young fish joining the stock plus the growth of 
original fish in the stock less the natural fish mortality. 
In theory, growth rate, r, is a function of the fish stock, P. Specifically, it is postulated that 
at very low levels of P, r is low. The r is low since at low P, there is not much fish in the stock to 
reproduce. AsP rises and more fish reproduce, r also increases and continues to rise until eventually 
it reaches a maximum level. Beyond this maximum, further expansion of P leads to a declining r, 
due mainly to physical limits on growth imposed by the environment of the sea. Thus, an inverted 
U-shape of the r curve defines the relationship between rand P. 
As man enters the fishery and starts to prey on the fish, the situation changes. By definition, 
r is now also the volum~ offish that can be caught by man in a sustained way without affecting the 
size of the stock. It is sustainable because with all of the natural growth in the stock captured by 
man, total stock will not grow but remain constant over time. 
Also, since man preys on fish and adds to their mortality, his activity may lead to the 
reduction of the fish stock. This implies that the relationship between fishing effort, E, and the fish 
stock is inverse. The lower E is, the higher is the equilibrium stock, P, and vice versa. The inverse 
relationship between E and P is shown in Figure 5 where the stock ;curve is downward sloping. 
When the relationship between the fish stock, P and the net natural growth, r, and that 
between the fish stock and fishing effort, E, are combined, aU-shaped relationship between rand 
E is derived (Figure 6). The relationship is one where at lower effort levels, the stock is high and 
this causes overcrowding and slow growth. As fishing effort rises, the stock declines and crowding 
is lessened, hence, causing faster growth. Finally, at too much effort, there is smaller stock to 
reproduce and growth slows down again. 
In Figure 6, the point at which the level of effort yields the maximum r is the maximum 
sustainable point. Here, the fish catch by man is also the biological optimum, or the maximum 
sustainable yield (MS Y) from the fishery. 
Also from Figure 6, getting values of the CPUE and contrasting them against the values of 
effort generates the CPUE curve in Figure 7. The CPUE is falling, thus reflecting the decreasing 







Figure 4. Relationship Between Growth of Fish Population (r) and 
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Figure 6. Relationship Between Fish Catch (Y) and Fishing 
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Figure 7. Relationship Between Catch Per Unit of Effort and 
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2.3 Economic Theory of Overfishing 
The biological model discussed above alone, however, will not be a sufficient basis for 
marine resource planning and management where economic concerns are important. Hence, the 
model above has to be transformed into an economic model. 
In brief, the transformation is facilitated by incorporating prices for fish catch and fishing 
effoti into the model to turn the biological parameters into economic parameters. To facilitate easy 
discussion, it is assumed below that the prices of fish and fishing effort are constant at all levels of 
catch and effort. 
To generate the economic model from the biological model, the catch curve in Figure 6 is 
converted into the total revenue or TR curve in Figure 8. This is done by simply multiplying catch 
by the fish price. As can be seen, the TR curve and the catch curve have similar shapes since given 
the constant fish price, the former is just a straightforward magnification of the latter, at all levels 
of effort. 
After deriving the TR curve, the total cost or TC curve is generated by multiplying the 
fishing effort by the price of effort (Figure 8). With the fixed price for effort, this curve is linear and 
upward sloping with a slope that is equal to the constant price of effort. 
From the TR and TC curves, average and marginal curves are derived (Figure 9). The 
marginal revenue or MR curve represents the slope of the TR curve while the average revenue or AR 
curve provides the revenue per unit of effort. On the other hand, the marginal cost or MC curve 
represents the constant price of effort and is the same as the average cost or AC curve. 
The economic model illustrated in Figures 8 and 9 states that as effort, E, initially increases, 
TR also increases. However, TR rises at a decreasing rate. Continued increases in effort brings the 
level of fish catch first to the economic optimum, the maximum economic yield or MEY. At MEY, 
the standard economic condition for profit maximization, which is MR equals MC, is met (see 
Figure 8). Therefore, from the economic standpoint, MEY and Emey are the most desirable yield and 
effort levels at which fishing may occur. 
If the fishery is efficiently run, fishing should stop at MEY where profits are at maximum 
(The vertical difference between the TR and TC curve is greatest). However, with complete 
open-access, fishing continues beyond MEY as more and more fishermen, motivated by the 
existence of profits, get into the fishery. This situation pushes the level of fishing past the economic 
optimwn and into the next optimum, the MSY. As shown earlier, MSY is the biological optimum 
and is the level of catch that is equal to the maximum net natural growth of the stock. 
At the MSY level, positive profit still exist as TR remains greater than TC (Figure 8). This 
















Figure 8. Total Revenue and Cost Curves and Cost Functions 
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Figure 9. Marginal and Average Revenue Cost Curves 
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positive profits are gone and, without any incentive to continue fishing, further human predation 
stops. The OA Y is the long-run equilibrium point of an open-access fishery . 
To end this section, both biological and economic models are important in the analysis of 
overfishing. The former model gives the groundwork for the latter model. For fishery management, 
the latter model have a more relevant application. 
The above models also show that unrestrained fishing effort due to open access will result 
to the inefficient overexploitation of resources in the fishery. The key then to the management of 



















MODELS OF MARINE OVERFISHING 
There are four general types of models which can be applied in the analysis of overfishing 
in the marine fisheries. These are the single species and constant price models, single species and 
variable price models, multiple species and constant price models and multiple species and variable 
price models. These models are discussed below. 
3.1 Single Species and Constant Price Models 
There are two main models falling under this category. Both are employed popularly in 
empirical research. These are the basic Gordon-Schaefer, or GS model, and the basic Fox Model. 
The basic GS model originated from Gordon (1953) and Schaefer (1954, 1957) while the basic Fox 
model has its beginnings in Fox (1970). 
3 .1.1 The Basic Gordon-Schaefer Model 
The basic GS model is founded on the biological relationships explained in the theoretical 
discussion of overfishing in Chapter 2. In mathematical tenns, the model struts out by assuming that 
between two points in 'time, the fish stock (P) rises at a natural rate (r) which is a single-valued 
function of the fish stock, or 
r=dP/dt=J(P). (1) 
With fishing by man, the fish catch (Y) per unit of time, e.g. year, is a function of the fish 
stock and the amount of the effort spent by man on fishing (E), or 
Y =g(P,E) (2) 
and that the fish stock is a function of fishing effort, or 
P=h(E). (3) 



















and this value of the catch and fish stock growth rate is the long-term yearly production for given 
levels of P and E. 
To continue, the GS model argues that with the limited area of the sea, the fish stock can only 
grow to a maximum size (M) which is the environmental carrying capacity of the sea. Given M, the 
model considers as a good approximation ofthe growth rate of the stock shown in equation (1) the 
quadratic equation 
(5) 
where a1 and M are constants and growth in the fish stock is assumed proportional to the difference 
between the maximum carrying capacity and the stock. In addition, the model takes as an 
approximation of the catch in equation (2) the linear relationship 
(6) 
where a2 is a constant. 




which now explains fish stock as a linear function of effort. Also, plugging equation (8) into 














where catch in equation (9) is a quadratic function of effort and the average CPUE in equation (1 0) 
is a linear function of effort. 
As explained in the theoretical discussion, the transformation of the biological model into 
an economic model requires the incorporation of prices for fishing effort and fish output into the 
model. 
The basic transformation is to assume constant prices. Thus, the total cost function (TC) for 
fishing is of the following form 
TC=j(E)=cE (11) 
where c is the constant price of fishing effort and TC is directly proportional to the amount of effort. 
Also, by assuming a constant price of fish caught (p ), equation (9) can be transformed into the 





TR =h E-b E 2 I 2 (14) 
where b1 and b2 represent the combined constants of the equation. 
From equations (11) and (14), the MSY, MEY and OA Y can be attained. Using marginal 
and average concepts, the marginal cost (MC) and average cost (AC) functions from equation ( 11) 
are 













AC = TC!E =cE/E =c. (16) 
On the other hand, based on equation (14), the MR and AR functions are 
MR =dTR/dE =h 1-2b.fi (17) 
and 
(18) 
As stated beforehand, the MEY is the production point where MR equals MC. Thus, from 









The MSY, on the other hand, is the point where MR is equal to 0. Equating equation (17) 
















where Emsy is the fishing effort at MSY. Combining equations (14) and (23) then gets 
or 
b h2 











where Eoay is the fishing effort at OA Y. Plugging equation (27) into equation (14) gets 
b -c b -c 
OAY =h (-1-) -b (-1-}2. 
I b 2 b 
2 2 
(28) 











and OA Y figures which will be derived based on the above equations will be in money terms. The 
derived values of the parameters need to be divided by the price of output, p,to express them in 
quantity terms. 
A graphical discussion of the GS model is the same as that already illustrated in Figures 
8 and 9 in Chapter 2 except that the TR curve is quadratic in form and symmetric. 
3.1.2 The Basic Fox Model 
Another type of single species and constant price model is the basic Fox model. This model 
is similar to the GS model in that its initial biological assumptions are the same. Thus, 
mathematically, equations ( 1) to ( 4) also holds for the Fox model. The difference is that while the 
GS model assumes quadratic catch and TR functions in equations (9) and (14) and a linear CPUE 




where c, and c2 are constants and both the total fish catch and average fish catch or CPUE are 
exponentially related to fishing effort. 
Transforming the biological Fox model into an economic model follows similar procedures 
used beforehand for the GS model. Again assuming constant prices for fish catch and fishing effort, 
the TC, MC and AC functions are the same as those in equations (11), (15) and (16). On the other 
hand, the TR function becomes 
'oC~ TR =pY=p(E~ I ) (31) 
























This value will then be plugged into equation (31) to derive MEY. 
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Plugging equation (38) into equation (31) gets 
or 







Finally, as before, the OA Y is the point where AR equals AC. Thus, equating equations ( 16) 
and (33) gets 
or 















1 oay~p( ) (e lnc_lnp). 
c2 
(43) 
As in the basic GS model, the MEY, MSY and OAY values derived for the Fox model are 
expressed in money terms. These values must be divided by the price of output, p, to generate the 
values in quantity terms. 
A graphical presentation showing the differences between the GS and Fox models is shown 
in Figure 10. In terms of the relationship between catch and fishing effort, catch in the Fox model 
decreases relatively slower than in the GS model beyond a corresponding MSY. As to the 
relationship between the CPUE and fishing effort, CPUE in the Fox model also declines slower 
beyond its corresponding MSY and asymptotically approaches the horizontal effort axis. 
3.2 Single Species and Variable Price Models 
3.2.1 The Modified Gordon-Schaefer Model 
The GS model can be modified to do away with the assumption of fixed prices and instead 
assume that the price of fish changes over time while the price of effort remains constant. This 
model was already empirically applied by Panayotou and Jetanavanich (1987). 
For this modified GS model, the basic biological conditions of the original model still holds. 
However, the economic portion of the model is changed. specifically, instead of describing revenues 
and costs in terms of fishing effort as done earlier, they are expressed in terms of fish catch (It will 
become apparent below that this transformation is necessary to make a connection between the 
variable fish price which is a function of fish catch and the revenues and costs which are previously 
functions of effort and not of catch). To do this, equation (9) is first converted into 
(44) 
where d1 and d2 are the combined constants. This catch equation is then reversed into the effort 
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Figure 10. Comparison of the Relationships Between Catch, CPUE and 
Effort in the Gordon-Schaefer and Fox Models 
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which is based on the quadratic formula and which, when plugged into equations (15) and (16), 




Since it is now variable, fish price is then expressed as a function of fish catch or 
p =k(Y). (48) 
Assuming a linear price function for equation ( 48) gets 
(49) 
where e 1 and e1 are constants and pis a decreasing function of catch. 
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In contrast to the fixed price model, the MEY is now computed by equating price to MC to 
get 
c 
p =MC =e -e Y =-----
1 2 m9 (d2-4d Y )l/2 
I 2 m9 
while MSY is derived by equating MR to AC to get 
2c 
MR=AC=e -2e Y =------
1 2 msy d ±(d2-4d Y )l/2 
I I 2 nuy 




Finally, if the fishery is monopolistically run instead of managed for the social good at MEY, the 
















MR=MC=e -2e Y = c 
I 2 my (d2-4d Y )l/2 
I 2 my 
(57) 
where MY is the monopolistic yield. 
A graphical presentation using per unit curves of the single species and variable price 
Schaefer model is shown below in Figure 11 reflecting the mathematically expressed relationships 
above. 
3.2.2 The Modified Fox Model 
Like the GS model, the Fox model can be modified by assuming that the price offish catch 
is variable and the price of fishing effort is constant. Procedurally, the catch equation shown in 
equation (29) is again transformed into an effort equation to get 
and 
From equatio~ (58), the AC and MC curves become 
TC cE c 
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Again assuming the linear price equation shown in equation ( 49), the MEY is generated by 
equating price to MC to get 
(61) 





- --- -· 
Figure 11. A Variable Price Schaefer Model Indicating the 
Maximum Economic Yield (MEY), the Maximum 
Sustainable Yield (MSY), Monopoly Position and 















OA Y is derived by equating AR to ACto get 
AR =AC=e -e Y =-c-. 
12oay C •C £ 
el 2 "!1 
(63) 
Lastly, if the fishery monopolistically operated, the optimal position is where MR and MC are 
equated to get 
MR =MC =e -2e Y =-c-. 
I 2 my c ,, ,: e I r-.. _, 
(64) 
It is not known if the modified Fox model above has been used empirically. Furthermore, 
no graphical presentati~n of this model is available in the literature reviewed here. 
3.3 Multiple Species and Fixed Price Models 
Both the GS and Fox models may be extended further to take into account the multiple 
species nature of the marine fisheries, assuming constant prices for individual species. A narrative 
and graphical discussion of this type of model is found in Panayotou ( 1982). The following 
discussion of multiple species and fixed price models is now general, i.e. applicable to both the GS 
and Fox models. 
Mathematically, in a multiple species fishery , total fish catch can be presented as 
n 
(65) 
where Y is total fish catch and Yi is fish catch of species i which is a function of total fishing effort, 
E. 
Assuming constant prices for the individual species, equation (65) can be converted into a 







where Pi is the fixed price of species i. 








With the constant price of fishing effort, the TC, MC and AC functions are the same as those 
shown previously in eq~ations (11 ), (15) and ( 16). Therefore, MEY is the total yield level where 
the following condition is satisfied 
" MR =MC = Lmr
1
(E) =c. (69) 
1· 1 
On the other hand, MSY is the total yield level which meets the condition 
" MR = L.mr
1
(E) = 0 (70) 
1· 1 
while OA Y is the total yield level that meets the condition 
n 
AR =AC = Ear
1
(E) =c. (71) 
I· I 
37 
A graphical illustration of the individual species catch and total catch curves of the multiple 
species models is shown in Figure 12. Also, assuming fixed prices for each species, the individual 
and total revenue curves will have similar forms. 
The total catch curve is the vertical summation of individual catch curves at different levels 
of total fishing effort. The behavior of the individual catch curves indicates that as total fishing 
effort is increased, the stocks of some commercial species, presumably those higher in the food 
chain, fall down. The species getting scarcer, however, are replaced by other species, presumably 
those below the food chain. Further increases in fishing effort ultimately leads to the loss of more 
and more commercial species in the fishery. 
Finally, the choice of which model to use, the Schaefer Model or the Fox model, will decide 
the shape of the catch and TR curves for the individual species. The use of the Schaefer model 
implies quadratic and symmetric catch and TR cmves while the employment ofF ox model implies 
exponential curves for the individual species. 
3.4 Multiple Species and Variable Prices Models 
The multiple species model can be extended further by assuming that prices of individual 
species catch are not constant but varies with the level of catch of the species. No study has yet 
conducted this kind of model, however. Below the multiple species and fixed prices model is 
summarized, again by way of generalization. 
As in the case of the single species and variable price model, in the multiple species and 
variable prices models the revenues and costs are again described not in terms of effort but in terms 
of catch. Specifically, the variable price of the individual species is expressed as 
(72) 
where p1 is the price of species i which is a decreasing function of the level of catch of species 
1 or Yi · 










Figure 12. Catch Curves for a Multiple Species Fishery 
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The TC function, on the other hand, which will be expressed in terms of the total catch, Y 
(by conversion similar to that applied in the single species and variable price model), is 
TC=l(Y) (76) 
and the MC and AC functions are 
MC =m(Y) (77) 
and 
AC=n(Y). (78) 
Finding the MEY, MSY and OA Y again follows procedures the same as those already 
applied. MEY is the total yield level where the following equation is satisfied 
and 
n 
MR =MC = Emr
1
(y) =m(Y) . (79) 
i· i 


















) =n(Y) . (81) 
1·1 
A mathematical or graphical discussion of the multiple species and variable price models is 
not available in the literature. The review has not encountered an empirical application of the model. 
3.5 Other Models 
Except from the Gordon-Schaefer and Fox Models, there are also other models which have 
been developed to analyze overfishing but not covered. In general, these models received little 
empirical application in developing countries such as the Philippines. Also, some of the models are 
simple variations of the GS and Fox models. 
A model which must be mentioned in this review, however, is the Pella-Tomlison model 
employed by Trinidad et al. (1993). This model differs from the GS and Fox models in that it 
provides some adjustment for the skewness in the plotted yield curve. Also, the paran1eters of the 
empirical model are estimated not by the usual ordinary least squares procedure but by a search 
routine. 
Trinidad et al. (1993) applied the model using single species and variable prices assumption. 
However, the model is not reviewed in detail here because of the inavailability of the original work 
of Pella and Tomlinson (1969) to the reviewers. The interested reader is refered to the Trinidad 







REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON OVERFISHING 
As mentioned, this literature review covers empirical studies dealing only on the economics 
of overfishing at the national level. There are five such works identified for the Philippines. On the 
other hand, the review found only a single work on overfishing in another Southeast Asian country. 
Numerous studies, however, have already been conducted on the economics of marine 
fisheries in the Philippines. The interested reader may refer to De Los Angeles et al. (1990) for a 
listing and review. A few of the studies cited in that work employed bioeconomic analysis. Others 
analyzed the marketing systems, production costs, revenues and profitability of the fisheries sector. 
Some evaluated socioeconomic conditions of fishing communities, specifically those of the small-
scale municipal fishermen. A few analyzed the impacts of fishery management policies on sectoral 
performance. 
There are also studies in the Philippines which evaluated the overfishing problem in 
particular areas, such as bays and coastal areas. Because of their limited and localized scope, they 
are not reviewed here and mentioned only in passing. The examples of these works are those by 
Pauly and Mines (198~), Silvestre, et al. (1987) and Silvestre et al. (1989). 
4.1 Empirical Studies on Overfishing in the Philippines 
The empirical economic literature on overfishing in the Philippines may be classified in 
terms of species coverage. Three of the works are on overfishing of small pelagics. These are 
Dalzell eta!. (1987), Trinidad eta!. (1993) and Padilla and De Guzman (1994). One study covered 
overfishing of demersal species (Silvestre and Pauly 1987). The last study by Schatz ( 1991) 
summarized the findings of earlier works and came up with some recommendations for the 
restructuring of the commercial fisheries industry. 
4.1.1 The Dalzell et al. Study 
This study evaluated overfishing of small pelagic species by utilizing data for the period 
1948-1985 constructed from published statistics of the BF AR. The variables considered by the study 
in evaluating overfishing were fish catch and fishing effort and the analytical model used was the 
fox model which assumed a composite small pelagic fish species and fixed fish and effort prices. 
The study gathered small pelagic catch data for both marine municipal and commercial 
fisheries. It defined municipal fisheries as covering vessels less than 3 gross tons in weight and 
commercial fisheries as covering vessels weighing at least 3 gross tons. The study furt~er identified 
the particular fish species it covered and ascertained their contributions to the marine fisheries catch 









To derive annual municipal small pelagic catch, the procedure used by the study was briefly 
as follows. The data for 1976 onwards were directly had from published sources. For the years 
prior to 1976 when no data were available, data on catch were extrapolated based on the mean shares 
of small pelagic catch to total municipal catch in the years 1976 to 1979. 
The data on the commercial small pelagic catch used by the study, on the other hand, were 
taken directly from the published sources as these were available starting 1948. However, since data 
for years prior to 1965 were considered under-reported, the study scaled them upwards using a 
scaling factor. Both the municipal and commercial small pelagic catch data used were measured in 
metric tons. 
The study measured fishing effort in terms of horsepower. For the municipal fisheries, the 
study found that no data on horsepower can be had from the sources, hence, necessitating the 
estimation ofthe data. To do this, the data from the past censuses of municipal fishing, conducted 
in 1948, 1970, 1977 and 1980, on the numbers of powered and non-powered vessels, horsepower 
of powered vessels and numbers of full -time, part-time and occasional fishermen were had. 
After generating the census data, the horsepower of powered vessels were taken directly as 
the effort data of powered vessels in the municipal fisheries. For the non-powered vessels, the 
horsepower equivalent of fishermen operating them were computed using a conversion factor. After 
this was done, the fishe_rmen horsepower was added to the powered vessel horsepower and the sum 
was adjusted for the proportion of the municipal effort directed towards small pelagics, which was 
estimated at 38 percent on the total. Lastly, the effort data were adjusted to its purse seine equivalent 
to fit with the commercial effort data. 
For the commercial fisheries, five gears which accounted for a majority of the small pelagic 
catch were considered. The fleet horsepower data for the years 1978 onwards were generated 
directly from the published sources. On the other hand, the data for years before 1978 were 
estimated using computed relationships between horsepower and tonnage and between tonnage and 
number of vessels for each of the gears. Overall, the study did several adjustments on the effort data. 
Most notable of this was the incorporation of the effort of the carrier fleet to total effort spent on 
catching small pelagic species by commercial fishermen. 
Based on the constructed 1948-85 data series, the study found that while catch of small 
pelagics had been increasing in earlier years, generally it had been falling since 1973. In contrast, 
the effort spent on catching small pelagics had been generally rising. Thus, CPUE had been falling, 
giving support to the argument that small pelagic species were already overfished. 
Using the Fox model, the study computed that the MSY in small pelagics fisheries was at 
544,000 metric tons at the fishing effort level of 256,000 horsepower, a level which was already 
arrived back in 1975. The study further estimated that the MEY was at 500,000 metric tons at the 








To attain economic efficiency level at MEY in the small pelagic fishery, the study estimated 
that fishing effort must be reduced to only about 35 percent of the current effort. If this is done, the 
study computed that a total maximum rent of $250 million at 1985 prices will be derived from the 
small pelagic fishery. 
In conclusion, the study recommended that since small pelagics were overfished, the effort 
spent catching them must be reduced, at the least down to the MSY level. However, since fishing 
effort was not equally distributed among fishermen, it also suggested that the reduction can be done 
selectively, penalizing more the large scale operators, including those employing basing and purse 
seine gears, and protecting the small scale fishermen. 
4.1.2 The Trinidad et al. Study 
This study dealt on the bioeconomics of the fishery for small pelagics and explored a mix 
of issues including biology, production technology and efficiency, costs and profitability and options 
for management. Its stated objective was to quantify total societal benefits from the small pelagics 
fishery. 
The study used both primary and secondary data. The primary data were collected through 
a cross-section survey conducted in selected sites in six regions of the country which accounted for 
a substantial share of s!nall pelagics catch. The sites included the Navotas Fishing Port Complex; 
Dalahican, Lucena City; Mercedes, Camarines Norte; Banago Wharf, Bacolod City; Guinhalaran, 
Silay City; Danao City, Cebu; Cawa-Cawa Boulevard, Zamboanga City; and Labuan, Zamboanga. 
The data collected were for February 1987 up to March 1988. The survey was intended to get 
information, primarily on the production economics by gear of the small pelagic fishery. 
The secondary data used, on the other hand, were time-series taken from the previous study 
by Dalzell et al ( 1987) and other published data sources. These data were utilized in an estimation 
of the yield, cost and revenue curves for small pelagic fishery. 
The study profiled the different gears used to catch small pelagics. These gears included 
surface gillnets, fish corrals, bagnets, drive-in nets, round haul seines under the municipal gear 
category and trawl, purse seines, encircling gillnets, ringnet and beach seines under the commercial 
gear category. Details about the operation, fishing season, fishing grounds, species caught and on 
how the gears were actually operated were provided. 
The study estimated the technical efficiency of the gears using three indices, namely, catch 
per fisher-hour, catch vessel ton per day and catch per adjusted horsepower per day. It found that 
the most efficient gear was the fish corral in the municipal category and the ringnet in the 
commercial category. Furthermore, in general, commercial fishing gears were found to be more 








The study also conducted an analysis of capital investment costs, operating costs and 
profitability related to the gears. Of the commercial gears, the ringnet was found to be most 
profitable while the purse seine was the most unprofitable. In the municipal category, the drive-in 
net was found to be the most profitable while the round haul seine was the most unprofitable. 
Overall, commercial gears were found to be more profitable than municipal gears. 
Analyzing further, the study measured the pure profits that the owners of the gears generated 
from their activities. Results showed that many municipal and commercial fleet owners suffered 
negative pure profits after deducting the opportunity costs of labor and capital. In the municipal 
category, the lone gear which exhibited negative pure profits to owners was the round seine. In the 
commercial category, three gears showed negative pure profits including trawler, purse seine and 
bagnet. The study concluded that this situation indicated a certain degree of misallocation of 
resources in the fisheries sector due to the continued employment of losing gears. 
Lastly, the study measured resource rents in the small pelagic fishery using a generalized 
stock production model and exponential cost function fitted on time-series data for the period 1949 
up to 1985. The data used by the study on catch and effort levels were taken from Dalzell et al. 
(1987), the cost per unit horsepower were estimated based on the results of the survey done by the 
study and the price of fish were taken constant based on the average price of small pelagics for the 
period 1979-1988. 
The results of estimation generally supported the findings of Dalzell, et. al.(l987) that 
overfishing has already occurred in the small pelagics fishery. The MSY was estimated at 515,000 
metric tons per year at the effort level of320,000 horsepower. The MEY was measured at 465,000 
metric tons per year at the effort level of 170,000 horsepower. The open-access effort, on the other 
hand, was estimated at about 410,000 horsepower which have already occurred in the early 1980s. 
In light of the above, the study estimated that to attain the efficiency levels MEY and MSY, 
the effmt spent on small pelagics must be reduced to about 60 percent and 20 percent, respectively, 
of present levels. To do this, the study recommended a holistic approach to fisheries management, 
that which considers a mixture of actions. Among these are increased investment in human capital 
to address population related issues; implementation of macroeconomic policies that does not 
promote, through effective subsidies, the further expansion of fishing activity; development of 
alternative non-fisheries based livelihood programs for fisherfolks; creation of a property rights 
scheme in fisheries that will diminish open access and promote long-term resource conservation; 
promotion of the backward and forward activities in the fisheries industry; and the development of 
gear reclassification standards and enforcement of area fishing limits. 
4.1.3 The Padilla and De Guzman Study 
The main objective of this study was to develop a framework for the environmental resource 










and economic rent levels also as a basis for its environmental accounting. Empirical application was 
again on the small pelagic fisheries. 
The study utilized time-series data on small pelagics for the period 1948-1991. For the catch 
data, the study used the same assumptions of Dalzell et al. (1987) to derive the series for 1948-1985. 
On the other hand, for the later years, the actual data were estimated using measured relationship 
between the catch and catch per unit effort in earlier years. 
For the fishing effort data, the study utilized basically the same procedures used by Dalzell 
et al. (1987) and, thus, except for some very minor differences also derived the same data series for 
1948-1995. For the latter years, effort data were computed using actual unadjusted data employing 
procedures applied for past years. 
The study used the Fox model to come up with a yield curve for small pelagic fisheries. 
Then, it used an exponential curve to explain the effort function. Results showed that the MSY was 
at 573,000 metric tons at fishing effort of294,000 horsepower, the MEY was at 569,000 metric tons 
at effort of 261,600 horsepower and the OA Y was at 457,000 metric tons at effort of 537,900 
horsepower. The economic rent if the fishery is operated at MEY is about P7, 128 million. 
Thus, the findings of the study again did not differ much from that of Dalzell et al.( 1987) and 
Trinidad et al. (1993). The study found likewise that there has been overfishing in small pelagics. 
This is not surprising given that the studies have used basically similar data sets and exponential 
models. 
In conclusion, the study discussed possible options for the reduction of effort in small pelagic 
fishery. The pros and cons related to the policy of retiring aging vessels and replacement by 
technologically advanced ones were discussed. So, were the application of market-based 
instruments, such as taxation of production inputs. Beyond the discussions, however, the study did 
not propose any definite measures for reducing fishing effort as its emphasis was on development 
of a methodology for environmental accounting in fisheries. 
4.1.4 The Silvestre and Pauly Study 
In contrast to the above three works on small pelagic species, this study covered demersal 
fish species. The analysis conducted spanned the period 1946-1984 and both the municipal and 
commercial fisheries . The objective was to investigate if overfishing exists in bottom dwelling 
spec1es. 
The study used catch data for identified demersal species taken from BF AR statistics to get 
total catch for the years 1952-1984, for both the commercial and municipal fisheries. Then, for the 
years before 1952, the municipal catch was estimated as a constant fraction of total municipal catch, 
where the fraction was based on relative catch performance in the years 1976-1979. On the other 






of the demersal component of the catch relative to the total commercial catch in the years 1952-1956. 
The catch data were measured in terms of metric tons. 
The method employed for measuring fishing effort for demersal species was as follows. 
First, since trawl was the major gear used for catching demersal species, its horsepower was taken 
as measure of fishing effort. The data on trawl horsepower were directly had from Dalzell et al. 
(1987). Then, from the lifted horsepower data, the final horsepower figures were generated by 
adjusting horsepower for assumed effects oflearning, the doubling of the trawl engine horsepower 
starting 1958, and the addition of horsepower of carrier vessels in used fishing operations starting 
1964. 
After deriving time-series catch and effort data for demersal species, the study proceeded to 
estimate the Fox model. As in the previous works, results were utilized to compute the levels of 
MSY, MEY and economic rent in the demersal fishery. 
The study found that the demersal species have been overfished biologically and 
economically . The estimated MSY was at a range of 340,000-400,000 metric tons per year while 
the MEY was at the range of 300,000-325,000 metric tons per year. Both levels were attained way 
back in the early seventies. 
The Study estimated that for MSY and MEY to be attained, the level of effort must be 
reduced to one-fifth arid three-fifths of the 1984 level, respectively. If the MEY is attained, the 
maximum economic rent that can be generated in quantity terms will amount to about 125,000-
200,000 metric tons offish, worth about P2.0-P3 .2 billion per year at 1984 prices. 
While the study found strong evidence of overfishing, it evaded from making any 
recommendations to address it. However, it supported the argument that decreasing fishing effort 
may serve the interest of the fisheries sector. In closing, it argued that less fishing effort will result 
to higher incomes for the fishermen and higher public revenues that can be employed on projects that 
will develop fishing activities in lightly exploited fishing areas and alternative livelihood 
opportunities in highly exploited fishing areas. 
4.1.5 The Schatz Study 
This study was basically a review paper and did not conduct any new estimation of 
overfishing. Its objective was to measure, using secondary information, the economic rent that can 
be derived from the commercial fisheries and fishpond aquaculture subsectors. Results were 
intended to provide a basis for rationalizing the license and lease rates imposed on commercial 
fishermen and public fishponds users. 
For the commercial fisheries, the study used mainly results of the studies of Dalzell et al. 
( 1987) and Silvestre and Pauly ( 1987) to generate estimates of economic rent. It argued that if the 






will be Pl5,000 per vessel yearly on the average and P300,000 for the whole commercial fisheries 
at current prices. 
The study admitted that the results of the previous studies on overfishing may be inaccurate. 
Thus any implementation of a sudden increase in license fees on commercial vessels based on past 
works may not be appropriate. Therefore, while the study suggested that license fees must be raised, 
it also proposed that it will be done only on a staggered basis, starting at the level ofPl,OOO per gross 
ton of vessels during the first year. 
The study made a strong case for raising the license fee rates not only for the specific purpose 
of reducing effort and in effect conserving fisheries resources but also to generate needed revenues 
for the government, raise productivity of the commercial fishermen and reduce fishing production 
costs especially in fuel consumption. It estimated that although jobs will be lost when the license 
rates move up, this will be more compensated by the above gains. 
The study further proposed that for the gradual increasing of the license rates, more accurate 
and reliable information from new research, specifically on the detailed assessment of fishery stock 
resources, must be had. In addition, constant monitoring of input and output prices need to be 
undertaken, to estimate actual annual costs, returns, profits and economic rents incuned and accruing 
to commercial fishermen. 
4.2 Empirical Studies on Overfishing in Southeast Asia 
Although only a single study in Southeast Asia was available and reviewed in this work, 
there may actually be several empirical studies on overfishing undertaken in other developing 
countries. In Thailand, for instance, fisheries studies, not necessarily on overfishing, already abound. 
The interested reader may refer to Panayotou and Jetanavanich (1987), the study reviewed below, 
for a listing and brief review. 
4.2.1 The Panayotou and Jetanavanich Study 
This study did a comprehensive analysis of the economics and management of the fisheries 
sector of Thailand and analyzed the degree of overfishing of demersal fisheries species in the Gulf 
of Thailand. 
The study used data on the Gulf of Thailand for the period 1963 to 1982. Catch data were 
measured in terms of actual fishing yield while effort was standardized fishing effort. The study 
used the GS model that assumed a composite fish species. Both the fixed price and variable output 
price assumptions were tried. 
Results of estimation indicated that the MSY of the demersal fishery in the Gulf of Thailand 
ranged from 796,000 to 958,000 tons depending on the mesh size used. This MSY level was 














The study concluded that since the current effort at the time the study was conducted exceeded the 
MSY level of effort, then the demersal fisheries of the Gulf of Thailand was biologically overfished. 
The study investigated economic overfishing, by first using the constant price assumption. 
Again, it generated an MEY effort levels that was lower than prevailing effort level. Moreover, it 
fow1d that if MEY levels were attained for the Gulf of Thailand demersal fisheries, the profits that 
can be had ranged from 1,880 to 2,713 million baht depending of mesh size, which represented a big 
gain from the profits at current levels of exploitation. 
When the variable output price assumption was used, the study derived similar results. It 
again found that MEY effort level was lower than the existing level implying economic overfishing. 
Also, it found that if fishing were at MEY levels, the profits, consumer surplus and total benefits that 
can be derived from the fisheries will be even much larger, regardless of mesh size, compared to the 
case of the fixed price situation. 
The study suggested that since both biological and economic overfishing already exists in 
the Gulf of Thailand, something must be about the problem. To lower intensity of fishing and 
enhance the fisheries resources in the area, the study suggested a mix of actions that can be 
implemented. These included an immediate halt to the construction of more trawlers, licensing and 
control of the activities of the existing vessels, assistance to small large-scale fishermen via fisheries 
enhancement projects such as development of artificial reefs, community fishing rights, conclusion 
of new joint ventures · and development of alternative sources of animal protein, income and 
employment. 
To recapitulate, from the review of the empirical literature conducted above, it is evident that 
marine overfishing has been a common conclusion of the past studies in the Philippines and in 
Thailand. It is observed, however, that all the studies were based mainly on species groupings and 
not economic sectors. Furthermore, the studies did not investigate the problem of overfishing at the 



















REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS FOR CONTROLLING OVERFISHING 
The general conclusion from the empirical works reviewed in the previous chapter that 
overfishing already exists in Philippine marine waters brings us to the question of how will 
overfishing be controlled. In this chapter, the regulatory options available to fishery authorities to 
contain the problem are reviewed briefly. For more detailed discussion, the interested reader may 
refer to Crutchfield (1961, 1969); Meany (1987); Buchanan and Tullock (1979); Scott (1979); 
Huppert (1979); Moloney and Pearse (1979); and Cunningham et al. (1985). 
5.1 Regulatory Instruments for Controlling Overfishing 
5 .1.1 Taxation 
Taxation as a fishery regulation for controlling the level of fishing effort can move the fishery 
from the suboptimal open access level to the economically optimal level via its potential effect on 
the decision-making of fishermen and not through direct imposition. There are two basic kinds of 
taxes in fisheries : the tax imposed on catch and the tax imposed on effort. 
5.1.1.1 Tax on Catch 
There are two ways of administering a tax on catch. It can be imposed across the board, 
regardless of peculiarities of the catch, or in a varying manner, considering the complications of the 
catch. For instance, the tax rate can be varied depending on the rate of depletion of a particular fish 
stock and the impact of the catch on other stocks. The rate could be higher for fish experiencing 
rapid rate of depletion or significantly affecting the performance of the other stocks. 
An example of a tax on catch is a specific levy per kilogram of fish. Theoretically, the levy 
will be set equal to the maximum resource rent to bring the fishery to the economically desirable 
level. The imposition of the tax will effectively bring down the price received for the fish by the 
fishermen, pull down the total revenue curve of the fishermen, force inefficient fishermen out and 
remaining ones to fish less, and eventually bring catch and effort to the economically optimal levels. 
The use of the tax on catch as a means for controlling total fishing effort in the Philippine 
marine fisheries have some serious disadvantages, however. Firstly, if tax is imposed on the catch 
of the fishem1en, monitoring the catch can be a costly administrative task that may negate gains that 
can be had with it implementation. 
Secondly, if there are no price controls in the fish market, fishermen can easily transfer the 
burden of the tax to the middlemen and then the middlemen to the consumers, with little income 





















market for fish and for many other consumer items because of a litany of reasons including the large 
number of informal markets, inadequate staff to monitor, inadequate communication systems and 
many other problems. 
A third problem with the tax on catch is that it is difficult to impose uniformly in the 
Philippines where many fishing grounds with different productivities exist. Imposing a uniform tax 
will unfairly penalize local fishermen who cannot move around to search for economically viable 
fishing grounds and advantage large and well-financed fishermen. 
Still another problem with a tax on catch is that it requires up-to-date and reliable price data 
and information for effective implementation. For instance, sudden and unpredicted changes in the 
price of fish, a common occurrence in the Philippines, can make the current tax rate impractical and 
generate strong opposition from the fishermen. 
The use of the tax on catch, however, has its advantages when fish catch is easy to monitor, 
reliable and up-to-date price data are available and fishing has constant productivities across areas. 
Minus the administrative cost of monitoring, the tax will likely be effective, especially when coupled 
with some degree of price controls to prevent fishermen and middlemen from transferring the tax 
burden to others. 
5.1.1.2 Tax on Effort 
A tax on effort can also be imposed uniformly regardless of the peculiarities of the boat or 
gear being taxed or in a varying manner depending on the type of boat or gear. Theoretically, the 
effect of a tax on effort is very similar to the effect of tax on catch. 
A tax on effort can be imposed on boats and set equal to the maximum resource rent derived 
by the boats. The imposition of the tax will bring up the total cost faced by the fishermen, force the 
inefficient boats out and eventually reduce the total effort to the economically optimal level. 
The imposition of a tax on effort has a distinct disadvantage in that there can be several ways 
to measure effort and coming up with one that is acceptable to the majority can be difficult. This 
constraint may force the application of a uniform levy on the boats falling under the same 
classifications, such as in terms of tonnage or horsepower, regardless of differences in actual fishing 
effort. 
Also, a tax on effort which is uniformly applied may in the long-run increase, instead of 
decrease, total fishing effort. This is because although the inefficient fishermen will leave after the 
imposition of the tax, the remaining ones will likely fish more to compensate for the loss in earnings 
due to the tax. As the tax is fixed, fishing more will raise the catch but not the tax, and this may 





















A third problem with the tax on effort is that even asswning that effort can be defined 
accurately, the different factors which contribute to total effort will need to be taxed separately for 
the taxing scheme to be effective. For instance, taxing the labor and horsepower separately and 
accurately must be done or fishermen will substitute the less taxed factor for the higher taxed one 
without necessarily reducing fishing effort as a whole. 
The above implies that a good and reliable data base by boat, or boat type at the least, will 
be necessary for taxation by effort to be effective. In the Philippines, this is hardly forthcoming as 
fishermen appear to change effort components without reporting to authorities, who do not demand 
such strict reporting themselves. 
5.1 .1.3 Taxation as a Whole 
Taxation, either of catch or of effort, is meant to capture excess profits from fishing and 
reduce fishing effort as well, and therefore must be considered for management use in the country. 
In theory, taxation will force fishing units with higher opportunity costs to leave and those with 
lower opportunity costs to remain in the fishery. This will result to optimal exploitation of fishery 
resources where government gets the economic rent for distribution to all, the remaining fishermen 
gets a respectable share of returns and the fishery resources are conserved for future use. 
In addition to the above, theoretically, taxation could also be a vehicle for the promotion of 
social equity in fisheries . When large boats are taxed more and small boats are taxed less, poorer 
fishermen are effectively protected and their richer counterparts penalized. When the tax revenues 
are spent on uplifting the lives of poor fishermen, social equity is pursued further. In a country 
inhabited mostly by poor people, progressive fisheries taxation may be a popular political measure. 
In reality, however, taxation is prone to wasteful errors and can attract corruption. As 
explained, taxation of catch or effort is complicated and, without the benefit of a reliable data base, 
can turn into a trial and error process. Moreover, administration of taxation in the Philippines 
fisheries can be badly tainted with corruption, as may taxation be as a whole. Due to these reasons 
and others already mentioned, the use of taxation may have limited effectiveness as a regulatory 
instrument. 
5. 1.2 Licensing 
Licensing is similar to taxation in that it is also employed to control fishing effort. However, 
unlike taxation which allows fishermen to decide for themselves whether or not to remain in the 
fishery , in a licensing scheme, the fishermen are directly driven out of the fishery by the governing 
authority . 
Basically, licensing is an instrument to directly regulate the number or participants in a 





















or fishing gear to operate. The goal of the fishery authority in issuing a license is to control fishing 
effort by controlling the number of permits given away. 
Licensing can be operated is different ways. For instance, it can be operated through the 
"grandfather system" where licenses are given only to existing fishermen and not to newcomers. To 
decrease fishing effort, licenses are made non-transferable so that existing fishermen who retire from 
fishing are not replaced by others. As a means of reducing effort fast, the grandfather system is 
clearly not effective as it may take a long time for fishermen, especially those who treat fishing not 
only as a livelihood but also as a way of life, to retire. 
To address the problem of fishermen longevity, another method can be employed where the 
licenses are again given to the present fishermen but a buy-back plan is also implemented by the 
governing authority. In this scheme, less efficient fishermen are allowed to get out of the fishery by 
buying from them the licenses at a price which is above the value of their discounted net benefits 
from the tishery. Because of the option to sell at a good price, fishermen are more likely to leave 
the fishery before their retirement age. 
Another licensing method is to have transferable licenses that allow trading of licenses 
among fishermen. An advantage of this approach is that license holders with high opp011unity costs 
can sell their licenses to those with low opportunity costs. This is expected to lead to an optimal 
allocation of resources because, eventually, only the fishing units with the lowest opportunity cost 
are left to hold the license and operate in the fishery. 
The transferable licenses, per se, however, may not result to a reduction of total effort in the 
fishery. In fact, when licenses are transferred to the more efficient fishermen, effort may rise as 
these people group will raise effort commensurate to the expansion of the right to fish provided for 
by the traded licenses. 
Still another licensing method is to sell the licenses at an auction, whether to existing or 
would-be fishermen. The number of licenses to be auctioned will have to be limited based on 
computed total fishing effort that will be needed to efficiently exploit the fishery. 
An auction will likely increase the price of the licenses and therefore increase public revenues 
from the license. It may also effectively reduce the level of fishing effort since the number of 
licenses to be offered will be limited. 
A problem with the auction system, however, is that it causes much of the benefit from 
fishing to accrue only to the government and the rich fishermen. Thus, poor fishermen may not be 
inclined to support it. On the other hand, if the revenues from the auction are earmarked for the 
development of the fishery or of communities of poor fishermen, then fishermen resistance to the 






















In general, the actual operation of a license has some other associated problems. For 
instance, whether the fisherman, boat or gear has to be licensed is an issue that needs to be 
addressed. Ideally, to avoid the possibility of factor substitution that will negate the effort limiting 
power of a license, a composite effort measure must be derived that covers labor, capital and 
technology factors. On this composite measure of effort will the imposition of the license be based. 
The Philippine fisheries sector, however, is still far from developing this ideal measure of effort. 
Another problem with the license is that for it not to prevent investment by the fishermen, 
it must have a duration period that is sufficient for investment to be profitable. On the other hand, 
the a long-term license can make regulation inflexible. Given the fast changing input and output 
market conditions that characterize the Philippine fisheries sector, long-term licenses can be 
impractical and difficult to implement. 
Inspite of the abovecited problems, in general, the license is superior to a tax because it 
entails less administrative costs in implementation. Further, it is likely more effective for reducing 
effort faster if the number of the licenses allowed are strictly limited. The auction, in particular, has 
advantages that must be considered, especially if it is implemented properly with strong support 
from the fishermen. 
5.1.3 Individual Fish Quota 
An individual fish quota is a way of regulating effort in the fishery by specifying the amount 
of fish that fishermen can catch. An individual quota can be exclusive or non-transferable and cover 
an indefinite period. It can also be transferable, marketable and cover a definite duration. When 
quotas are transferable and sold, they are usually denominated into small units in order to encourage 
an active market for quotas an1ong the smaller-sized but relatively more numerous fishing units. 
A more common way of allocating quotas is the open auction method. In this method, the 
quotas are sold through a bidding process among fishermen. Whoever bids the highest price for a 
specific quota holds the right to catch the specified amount of fish. The auction is intended to get 
the excess profits obtained from the fishery and revert it to the regulating authority. Also, it ensures 
that the witmers to the rights are the most efficient users of the resource. 
Another means of allocating the quotas is by basing it on the historical catch criterion. Quotas 
are awarded to existing fishing units in proportion to their catch during a past qualifying period. 
This method, however, is difficult to administer with new fishermen who has no fishing records. 
Still another means of allocating quotas is by drawing lots among fishing units. This, 
however, does not guarantee that the most efficient fishing units will get the quota. 
In general, fish quotas are either in terms of quantity, such as tons offish, or as a percentage 
of the total allowable catch. Quotas, however, can also be specified based on other parameters, 




















in a ce1iain season, the amount of allowed catch in a quota could be lessened that season. In effect, 
the quota controls fishing effort within the season concerned. 
It can be seen that the fish quota as a regulatory instrument will require reliable data on which 
to base amount or percentage of the quota. Data on total allowable catch will be needed. In the 
Philippine fisheries where several species are involved, knowing the total allowable catch as well 
as the historical catch data of fishermen will be a daunting task. 
Another problem with the fish quota is that if applied across all species, it can lead to higher 
overall effort instead of lower effort. This is because with a quota, fishermen may discriminate 
against less commercially attractive species in favor of the highly priced species to increase profits. 
This will lead to the sorting of catch that in the end raises total effective effort as well as wastage of 
fish catch. 
Still another problem with a fish quota is the monitoring and enforcement. With the 
numerous fishermen, long coastline and broad fishing areas of the Philippines, monitoring the catch 
of fishermen will entail administrative costs that can be more than the expected benefits from the 
implementation of the quota. 
While many problems can be associated with the possible use of a fish quota in the 
Philippines, the individual transferable or tradable quota (ITQ) in particular has been shown to be 
effective in New Zealand (e.g. Panayotou 1995; Pearse 1991). At present, the utilization of this form 
of quota already has been expanded in that country. While there may be several differences in the 
fisheries situation in the Philippines compared to that ofNew Zealand, the quota system must me 
seriously studied and considered as management alternative for possible application in the fisheries 
sector in the fu ture. 
5.1.4 Overall Quota 
An overall fish quota is a limitation on the total volume of fish that can be caught from the 
fishery. There is no limitation on the number of the fishermen allowed to fish. However, once the 
quota has been reached, the whole fishery is automatically closed for the remainder of the fishing 
season. 
Outwardly, an overall fish quota seems quite straightforward to apply. For instance, once 
the level ofMSY or MEY is known to the fishery authority, then the quota can be set equal to it and 
any fi shing beyond it is forbidden. 
A deeper look at the overall quota, however, shows it has its share of shortcomings. First, 
output and not effort is limited with the quota. Thus, there is no guarantee that effm1 will decrease 
with the quota. This is because when level of fishing is limited to MSY or MEY, profitability of 





















allowed for catching. This competition will eventually raise, instead of decrease, fishing effort at 
least in the short-run. 
Second, with more fishermen catching a limited amount of fish, the fishing season will 
become shorter. It follows that the price of fish will be low only for a short season and then it will 
rise sharply thereafter. This of course, will not be good for a fish consuming country like the 
Philippines which requires steady fish supply and prices all year long. 
Third, with volumes of fish caught in a short season, there will be the need to put up 
processing plants to process the fish for future consumption. The possibility of additional 
investment in processing plants in the Philippines may not be there, however, especially given that 
fish to be processed will not be available whole year round. Hence, it is likely that a lot offish will 
be sold cheaply or wasted during the short fishing season. 
Finally, monitoring the total catch of the whole fishery will be a great problem with an 
overall fish quota. With so many fish outlets and limited communication systems, adding the total 
fish catch and enforcing a ban thereafter will be an impossible task for the authorities to conduct. 
5.1.5 Gear Restrictions 
Gear restrictions are another form of limiting effort in the fishery. Either a certain gear is 
circumscribed in its use or banned outright. Restrictions may not only be on the gear itself but also 
in terms oflimitations on the engine size, boat length, number of hooks per line, net size, dredge size 
and beam width and other features. 
Gear restrictions are generally aimed at lowering the catching efficiency of fishing . Hence, 
it is likely to be applied more on efficient gears. Also, usually a gear is being restricted because of 
its ability to destroy sea beds, corals and other fish habitats. 
A problem associated with gear restrictions is that fishermen will simply substitute other less 
efficient, and more costly, gears in place of the restricted efficient gear. This means that fishing 
effort will not decrease at all while production costs of fishermen are raised. The end result will be 
lower net returns for fishermen and higher fish prices for consumers. 
As a tool for effectively curving acutely destructive fishing, however, gear limitation is a 
desirable instrument. It is likely be less effective when used as a means to control the total effort in 
the fishery. 
5.1.6 Mesh Size Limitation 
Restrictions on the mesh size are intended to limit the size of the fish that can be caught to 
a certain minimum so that smaller and younger fish will have the time to biologically or 




















of smaller fish, the size of caught fish and the MS Y and MEY in the fishery. 
A problem with increasing mesh size is that by itself it will not reduce effort in the fishery. 
A rise in the MSY and MEY due to larger mesh sizes will increase the profits and economic rents, 
encourage more fishermen to enter into the fishery and effectively raise the total fishing effort. The 
increase in overall effort may erode whatever gains in the fish stock resulting from the mesh size 
restriction. 
Another constraint of the mesh size restriction is that many fishermen catch several species 
of fish with varying optimum sizes. Any mesh size will still result in the catching of at least some 
immature fish or the non-catching of some mature fish belonging to certain species. On average, 
then, the effect of a limit on mesh size may be minimal or uncertain to the growth of the total fish 
stock. 
Still another problem with mesh size limitation is that it is hard to monitor compliance 
among fishermen. In the Philippines, particularly, mesh size limitation has been known to be 
ineffective because of lack of forceful enforcement. 
For a single-species fishery in a limited fishing area such as a bay, however, mesh size 
limitations can be effective since the job of monitoring will be easier. Also, it can be potent when 
used in support of instruments directly limiting effort at the fishery-wide level. 
5.1.7 Closed Seasons 
A closed season is a period when fishermen are not allowed to fish certain species or at all. 
It is usually instituted when the quality of the fishery stock is poor, the stock faces irreversible 
damage or near extinction or when the stock is in spawning season. Generally, a closed season will 
lead to a better and larger stock at the cost of foregone earnings on the part of fishermen. 
A problem with a closed season is that if the stock is always vulnerable to exploitation, the 
rate of fishing in the next season will be higher resulting in the reduction of the stock back to the pre-
closed season level. This may be true with species which are highly priced in the market 
particularly. 
Another problem with a closed season is that it is likely to be economically suboptimal. A 
closed season is usually implemented at times when the fish stock is most vulnerable to capture. 
Hence, prohibiting the catching offish when catching costs are low will counter efficiency concerns. 
In the Philippines, even a single closed fishing season for the whole fishery sector will be 
impossible to implement because of the dependence of a great number of the population on the 
fisheries sector and the fish eating nature of the entire consuming public. The political opposition 














species nearing extinction may be acceptable to the population who are slowly beginning to 
understand the value of preservation to their welfare. 
5.1.8 Closed Areas 
A closed area is an area where fishing is not allowed for a part or all of the fishing season. 
Usually, a closed area restriction is imposed in a known fish nursery area during spawning periods. 
The intention is to provide the fish stock with space to reproduce without disturbance. 
Given the diversity of fish in the sea, the gain from a closed area restriction must be weighed 
against the loss in catch because of the limitation. The limitation is of course based on the belief that 
the eventual addition to the stock due to the protection of a fish nursery area will be more than the 
lost catch from the area. 
In the Philippines, closed areas are not only used to protect nursery grounds but also to 
protect certain endangered species and other resources. It has been known to be successful in many 
cases. Obviously, however, like closed seasons, it cannot be implemented at a grander scale to 
reduce effort in the whole fishery sector. 
To summarize the overall discussion, this chapter presented the different instruments for the 
management and regulation of the fishery sector. Each of the regulatory instruments has its share 
of advantages and disadvantages. In light of the peculiarities of Philippine fisheries, however, it is 
clear that some have better potential than others. In particular, licensing and gear and mesh size 
restrictions have already been employed to some extent in the country. Because of the experience 
gained from their utilization, the continued use of the license scheme, albeit with reforms in the 
license rates, is an option that the authorities may contemplate. Still another promising option is the 














REVIEW OF FISHERIES ADMINISTRATION, GOVERNING LAWS AND USE OF 
REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES 
In this chapter, a brief background of the administration of the Philippine fisheries sector, 
its basic governing laws and its experience in the use of regulatory instruments is presented. The 
purpose is to generate a picture of the government as fishery administrator, specifically in the area 
of resource conservation. 
6.1 Brief History of Fishery Administration in the Philippines 
Very little is known about fishery administration before and during the time of the Spanish 
occupation . However, in the year 1907, during the American occupation, explicit involvement 
of the national government in fishery administration commenced when the Fishery Section was 
established under the Bureau of Government Laboratories . Thereafter, when this bureau was 
reorganized and renamed the Bureau of Science, the Division of Fisheries was created. 
The Division of Fisheries was expanded in 1933 and called the Fish and Game 
Administration and pla~ed under the Department of Agriculture and Commerce. Then, six years 
later in 1939, the Division of Fisheries and Zoology was formed under the Bureau of Science. 
During the early part of the Japanese occupation, the Bureau of Forestry and Fishery was 
created to run fishery affairs in the country. Later in the war, the functions of forestry and fishery 
were separated and a Bureau of Fisheries was established . 
After the Japanese occupation, the old pre-war Division of Fisheries was reestablished and 
then moved to the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, which later was later reorganized 
into the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources . In 1963, this bureau was replaced by 
the Philippine Fisheries Commission, also under the Department of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources. 
In 1974, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources was reorganized and split 
into the Department of Agriculture and Department of Natural Resources. The BF AR, the agency 
tasked to manage fisheries, was put under the jurisdiction of the latter department. Then, in 1984, 
control of BF AR and other fisheries related agencies was turned over to the Ministry of 
Agriculture. 
In 1987, the Department of Agriculture was reorganized. The BF AR was placed under 
the production group of the department, where it remained until the present. With the inclusion 
of the BFAR into the production group, the fisheries sector has been mainly considered as a 




















was entrusted responsibility of ensuring the optimum and productive condition of the fisheries and 
aquatic resources of the country. 
To recapitulate, fisheries administration in the Philippines dated back to the time of the 
American occupation. Over time, the different fishery agencies established have been under 
different departments. The latest agency, the BFAR, is under the Department of Agriculture. 
The role of the BFAR is primarily to ensure food sufficiency but its function also includes the 
maintenance of an optimum and productive condition of fisheries resources . 
6.2 Brief History of Fisheries laws in the Philippines 
Laws governing the use of coastal and inland water resources in the country dated way 
back to the year 1866 during the Spanish occupation. The Spanish Law of Waters, adopted in the 
country on August 3, 1866, formed in those early times the main basis for the authority and 
supervision of the government over the public waters. This law defined the extent of the national 
domain to include all the coasts of the maritime frontiers of the Spanish territory, including its 
shores, natural ponds, lakes, rivers and river beds. 
After the Philippine independence from Spain in 1898, the main laws in fisheries consisted 
of Commonwealth Acts 2657 in 1917 and 2711 in 1934. These laws embodied the regulation of 
municipal fishing activities by the municipal councils. However, since they focused on municipal 
fishing, they did not cover the administration of the vast expanse of commercial fishing territory 
which was part of the national jurisdiction. 
Later, the enactment of Republic Act No. 4003 in 1932 paved the way for a comprehensive 
fisheries administration policy in the country. This act, known as the Fisheries Act of 1932, 
defined the powers of the national government regarding the administration of fisheries resources. 
Specifically, it defined the dual authority of the national and municipal governments to regulate 
the fishery sector. 
The Fisheries Act of 1932 was later amended by a series of Commonwealth and Republic 
Acts. Among the more important features of the amended act was the provision for protection 
of fisheries resources through the establishment of closed fishing seasons and areas, restrictions 
on the employment of explosives and poison in fishing, protection of fish eggs and fry, restrictions 
concerning water pollution, and restrictions on importing fish. 
Aside from the Fisheries Act, the Philippine Constitution of 1935 also addressed the 
fisheries sector. Under Article XII of the constitution, exploitation of the marine resources of the 
country were exclusively awarded to Filipino citizens and to corporations or associations with at 
least 60% of capital stock owned by them. 
Starting in the 1970s up to the present, the fisheries sector has been governed basically by 





















before it. Under it, BFAR was given the sole jurisdiction and responsibility over the 
management, conservation, development, protection, utilization and disposition of all fishery and 
aquatic resources of the country except municipal waters which falls under the municipal or city 
governments. 
Finally, Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code which was enacted in 1991 
significantly affected fisheries as several of its provisions concern specifically on the sector. 
Among others, the code granted the local governments to enact and enforce laws and measures 
aimed at conserving and protecting municipal fisheries . In particular, the Provincial Governor 
is empowered by the code to adopt necessary measures to safeguard and conserve the fishery and 
other natural resources of the province in coordination with the mayors. This power includes the 
authority to impose some regulatory instruments, such as closed season or area, whenever the 
fishery resource is facing the risk of deterioration. 
Because of its local emphasis, the code specifies management of fisheries only within local 
jurisdictions and is generally silent on the management of commercial fisheries. Thus, the role 
of conserving fishery resources outside of the local jurisdictions remains in the hands of BF AR. 
In summary, laws in the Philippines related to the management of the fishery sector have 
been enacted over the years. The laws have recognized that the public sector must play a part in 
efforts to conserve fishery resources. In recent years, the responsibility of preserving the local 
fishery resources fall more and more on the local governments while that of conserving the 
commercial fishery resources fall on the national government. 
6.3 Review on the Use of Regulatory Instruments 
Presidential Decree No. 704 and succeeding decrees, letter of instruction and 
administrative order contained important provisions related to the implementation of regulatory 
instruments in marine fisheries. The most important of the provisions are the following. 
First, Presidential Decree No. 704 specified that any fishery activity in the country should 
be accompanied by a license, lease or permit, including commercial and municipal marine fishing. 
It also stipulated that commercial fishing is allowed to operate only in coastal waters 7 fathoms 
deep or more. Furthermore, the decree disallowed the use destructive fishing techniques and 
imposed some limitations on trawl fishing. 
Second, Presidential Decree No. 704 likewise provides for the preservation of certain 
fishery areas through the establishment of fish refuges or sanctuaries. In addition, it also 
stipulates the setting aside of some areas reserved for use by the government or the inhabitants 
of the municipalities for fish culture, research and scientific purposes. 
The stated penalties for violations of the above provisions have been severe. For 

















it results to injuries, or life imprisonment or death sentence if it results to a loss of human life, 
were imposed. Furthermore, the employment of poisonous substances is punishable by 
imprisonment for a period of 10 years or up to 12 years if it results to physical injuries or life 
imprisonment or death sentence if it leads to a loss of life. 
The penalties for other violations, however, were light. The penalty for trawl fishing in 
shallow areas, for instance, is only not more than a fme of P1 ,000 or imprisonment for one year. 
Also, an intrusion of a vessel into a reserved or closed fishing area is only subject to a maximum 
fine of P5, 000. 
Later, Presidential Decrees Nos. 1015 and 1058 issued in 1976 amended the provision of 
Presidential Decree No. 704 on licensing of commercial and trawl fishing and penalties on illegal 
fishing. In general, these two decrees stipulated stiffer limitations and penalties for violations of 
the imposed regulations than before. 
Then, in 1977, Letter of Instruction No. 550 stipulated the training of barangay officials 
to serve as deputy fish wardens in the enforcement of fishery regulations. This action was 
designed to strengthen the implementation of the regulations in local areas. 
In 1984, under Fisheries Administrative Order No. 144, the annual license fees for 
commercial fishing were prescribed. The fees that were specified for different boat classifications 
were as follows: · 
Boat Classification 
Non-Powered fishing boat 
of more than 3 GT 
Powered Basnig I Bagnet of 
more than 3 to 25 GT 
Sapiao, kubkub, talakop 
and I or other fishing gear 
more than 3 to 25 GT 
For powered vessel used for 
trawl I towing boats of more 
than 3 to 25 GT 
For powered vessel more 
than 25 to 50 GT 
Annual License Fee 
P50. 00 + P2. 00 per gross 
ton or fraction thereof 
P100.00 + P2.00 I gross 
ton or fraction thereof 
P100.00 + P2.00 I gross 
ton and fraction thereof 
regardless of fishing 
gear used 
P125.00 + P2.00 I gross 
ton and fraction thereof 
P150.00 + P2.00 I gross 





















For motorized boat of more 
than 50 but not more than 
75 GT 
For motorized boat of more 
than 100 GT to 150 GT 
For motorized boat of more 
than 150 to 250 GT 
For motorized boat of more 
than 250 GT 
P200.00 + P2.00 I gross 
ton and fraction thereof 
P350.00 + P2.00 I gross 
ton and fraction thereof 
P500 .00 + P2.00 I gross 
ton and fraction thereof 
P1 ,000 + P2.00 I gross 
ton and fraction thereof 
It is obvious from the above that the license fees imposed on the commercial fishery 
subsector were negligible. At the time of imposition, this was understandable as the low rates 
were primarily designed neither to raise government revenues nor control fishing effort but to 
encourage the further development of the commercial fisheries sector. 
Finally, a series of administrative orders in the seventies and eighties were promulgated 
to impose regulatory ii).struments on specific fishing gears and areas in the country. For some 
years, closed seasons were imposed on the use of trawls and purse seine in Bohol, Cebu, Negros 
Oriental, Quezon Province and Palawan. Also, closed seasons were imposed on the use of all 
kinds of fishing gear in Panguil Bay and on commercial fishing in San Miguel Bay and on ring 
net within seven kilometers from the shoreline in Camiguin. 
To sum up, there is already a history of use of regulatory instruments in the Philippines, 
especially in recent years. The instruments used include licensing, banning of destructive fishing 
techniques, area limitations, and closed seasons. The prescribed penalties imposed on violations 
of the use of destructive fishing methods were severe. On other hand, the license rates imposed 
on the commercial fisheries were minimal. For purposes of fishery development, the low rates 























PART 1: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In summary, the fisheries sector of the Philippines has been a major food, income, 
employment, and foreign exchange generating component of the economy. It has been argued, 
however, that this sector is faced with a serious problem at present. In particular, empirical studies 
found that marine waters of the country have been overfished. 
The available empirical works on overfishing, however have concentrated on grouping of fish 
species, i.e. small pelagic and demersal species. No work has been done that directly investigates 
overfishing at the sectoral level, i.e. commercial, municipal and overall marine fisheries. Moreover, 
the over fishing of individual species has yet to be addressed. 
This review first looked into the theory, models and empirical works on overfishing with the 
purpose of developing an analytical model(s) useful for analyzing overfishing by sector. After This, 
it discussed the different regulatory instruments to analyze some of the possible instruments for 
curving overfishing. Finally, it discussed the different fishery institutions, laws and experience in 
the use of regulatory instrun1ents to see how the public sector has done as a preserver of marine 
resources. 
The review found that the biological and economic theories on overfishing are established 
theories. The more widely used models for overfishing are the GS and Fox models. These models 
can be used under different assumptions related to the nature of catch, i.e. single-species or multi-
species, and the prices of inputs and output, i.e. variable or fixed. Aside from the two models, there 
may be several other models for overfishing, however, some of which are variations of the two 
models mentioned, which are not reviewed here due to time and accessibility constraints. 
From the review, it is clear that a GS model or Fox model can be employed to study 
overfishing at the sectoral level. The main constraints and determinants of the exact type of model 
that can be applied will depend on availability of time-series catch and effort data as well as data on 
prices of fish and fishing inputs. Another constraint is the inexact measurement of fishing effort. 
While the common measure of effort is horsepower in the empirical literature reviewed, there will 
be the need to improve on this approach, given the importance of other factors of production, e.g. 
manpower and technology. 
The review of regulatory instruments shows that there are many of these which have the 
potential for controlling fishing effort. The regulatory instruments have common and distinct 
advantages and disadvantages. Some have potential for implementation nationally while others are 
likely more effective if used on a site specific basis. There is no single instrument that appear, by 
itself, to have all the capability to solve overfishing. There were reports, however, that the use of 











The national government has a long history of administrative involvement in the fisheries 
sector, dating back to the colonial times. At present, the national government is in charge of the 
administration of the commercial fisheries while local governments administer the municipal 
fisheries . In recent years, more and more power have been devolved to the local governments, 
especially those related to preservation and protection of marine resources in local areas. 
The review indicated that over the years, several agencies have been established under 
different departments to administer the affairs of the sector. At present, the fisheries sector is run 
by the BF AR, an agency under the Department of Agriculture. Overall, fisheries has been taken by 
the national government primarily as a food producing component of the economy. The role of 
government as preserver of fishery resources have been given secondary emphasis. 
There have been several laws which formed the main basis for fishery administration in the 
country. ln these laws, provisions for sustainable development and optimal exploitation of resources 
can be found . Again, however, these functions were secondary to the main function of food 
production. 
The review indicated that the country has experience in the actual use of regulatory 
instruments. Presently, a major use of a regulatory instrument is the implementation of a license 
scheme for the commers:;ial fisheries. The license rates per boat, however, are minimal, due to the 
standing policy of promoting the development of the fisheries sector. It is obvious, then, that this 
regulatory instrument did not influence the rate of fishing in the commercial fisheries . Furthermore, 
the public revenues from the low license fees is clearly a minimal source of funds for the 
government. 
The policy of developing fisheries as a food producing sector of the economy is well placed 
but must be tempered in light of the destruction of the fisheries resources brought about by too much 
fishing. In these times, resource conservation must be afforded at least equal importance by the 
government. In this light, serious thought must be afforded to whether administration of the fisheries 
shall fall within the domain of the Department of Agriculture or another department specializing 
work on resource and environmental conservation. 
As to the choice of particular approaches that can be used to curve fishing effort in the marine 
fisheries sector, these will be discussed in more detail in the final recommendations of the study in 
Part II. At this point, it is obvious from the review that several options can be considered. In the 
short-run, for instance, since the licensing system has been used for some time already and the 
authorities have experience in employing it, then its continued use may be prudent. However, the 
license rates have to be raised to reflect economic rents in fisheries. Furthermore, the number of 
licenses must be fixed to a maximum, to meet sustainable standards. 
Another option that can be explored is the open bidding of the licenses to fishermen. This 















but to the efficient fishermen who can compensate the full economic value of the licenses. The open 
bidding will also discourage any corruption that may result from the allocation of rights to fish. 
As mentioned, over the long-term, more innovative ways of managing fishery resources must 
be discovered. The ITQ system, in particular, is promising in that it has already been shown to work 
in another country. 
Finally, regulatory instruments other than the above can be, and have been, used to curve 
overfishing, including closed seasons and closed areas in bays and areas that are overexploited or 
where species are endangered. With the newly mandated involvement of the local governments in 
natural resource preservation and management, the use of the instruments are advantageous since 




















PART II: EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION 
CHAPTER VIII 
EMPIRICAL MODELS AND THE CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC RENT 
8.1 Overall Description and Assumptions of the Models 
As shown in Chapter II, there are several models which can be used to evaluate marine 
resource overfishing. These include those that assume constant or variable fish and fishing effort 
prices as well as single species or multiple species fisheries. The actual models prominently 
employed in empirical studies are the GS and Fox Models. 
For the empirical analysis of this work, both the GS and Fox models were estimated. 
However, in the computation of sustainable levels of operation, i.e., MSY, MEY, OA Y, only the 
model with the superior goodness-of-fit was employed. In general, the GS model showed better fit 
relative to the Fox model. Hence, for purposes of consistency, it was utilized to measure the 
sustainable levels of operation throughout. 
Fixed prices for fish catch and fishing effort were assumed in the estimation. This constraint 
was forced by the limited reliable time-series information on prices of fish and fishing effort. The 
alternative approach of estimating the time-series prices of effort based on price indeces and a point 
in time price value, as done in at least one of the previous studies (Trinidad, et al. 1993 ), was not 
done due to its likely inaccuracy given the long period covered by the study. Also, changing the 
price of fishing effort without varying the price of fish catch, as was done in the past study, is 
considered an inappropriate way of analysis. 
For the analysis of the overall marine fisheries and its two subsectors, commercial and 
municipal fisheries, the study assumed a single and composite-species fishery. As shown in the 
review, however, the assumption of composite fish species, has a history of use in empirical works 
on overfishing. 
In the estimation for commercial fisheries, purse seine was highlighted over the other gears 
because it is the most important gear in that subsector. All the other commercial gears were lumped 
into a single category "other gears". In the computation, data for "other gears" were computed as 
the difference between data for the commercial fisheries and data for purse seine. Only the 
biological models were computed at the gear level. For municipal fisheries and overall marine 









For the analysis of the individual fish species, the multiple species assumption was used. 
Also, only the important species were considered in the analysis. Moreover, the species whose data 
were unreliable were not covered. Only biological models were estimated for the individual species. 
8.2 The Concept of Economic Rent 
Aside from the MSY, MEY and OAY, a sustainability indicator that was measured was the 
economic rent. This indicator has been defined in many ways but a convenient and general 
explanation can be found in Schatz (1991, p. 3), which calls it the net return that occurs when 
publicly owned natural resources, such as fisheries, are used in an economically optimal way. This 
net return is equal to the excess profits which is the difference between the overall economic value 
of the products produced from the activity less the economic cost of production, where the cost is 
inclusive of normal profits. 
From the above definition, it is clear the economic rent means the excess profits at MEY, 
which is the economically optimal point. In this study, a minor clarification in the definition of 
economic rent was made. Here, the term "maximum economic rent" or MER means the excess 
profits at MEY in the marine fisheries sector. On the other hand, the term "economic rent" or ER 
means the excess profit at any of the point of operation. 
The MER and ER can be expressed mathematically respectively as 
MER = TRmey - TCmey (82) 
and 
ER=TR-TC (83) 
Redrawing Figure 8 in Figure 13, MER is the area represented by abed. ER, on the other 
hand, is illustrated by any rectangular area reflecting the difference between the total revenue and 
total cost curves. 
The empirical estimation done will test the hypothesis that overfishing is occurring in the 
marine fisheries at the considered levels of disaggregation. In terms of results of the estimation of 
the GS model, this hypothesis will be reflected by the generation of positive and significant intercept 
and negative but significant coefficient in the estimation of equation (9). In case of the Fox model, 
this hypothesis will be supported by getting a negative and significant sum of the intercept and 











Figure 13. The Gordon-Schaefer Model and Maximum 
Economic Rent in Marine Fisheries 




















MARINE FISHERIES DATA FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
9.1. Data for Commercial Fisheries 
9.1.1 Data Sources for Commercial Fisheries 
The study used secondary time-series data for the commercial fisheries sector covering the 
period 1948-1994 only. The sources of data were the BFAR and BAS. 
Table 4 describes the published sources of data and the data gathered. The "Fisheries 
Statistics of the Philippines" of BF AR contains a time-series commercial fisheries by-gear data on 
fish catch and on gear horsepower, tonnage and number. However, the years when data were 
available differ for horsepower, tonnage and number. 
In 1988, BF AR terminated the collection and publication of fisheries data and this function 
was taken over by BAS. There have been reports that the quality of fisheries data deteriorated due 
to this transfer of functions (e.g. Padilla and de Guzman 1994, p. D-4). 
The three relevant publications of BAS after 1987 for this work were the "Fishery Statistics", 
"Commercial Fishery Production Statistics" and "Selected Fishery Statistics". These data sources 
contain only information on catch but none on horsepower, tonnage and number of gears. 
Furthermore, for several of the years, only total commercial catch data were available. 
9.1.2 Catch in the Commercial Fisheries, 1948-87 
The commercial catch data for the period 1948-87 from BF AR are shown in Table 5. Dalzell 
et. al ( 1987, p.2) noted that data prior to 1965 were under-reported. Hence, a readjustment to take 
account of this problem was done later in this study. 
In 1987, the catch of purse seine was about 40 percent of the total commercial catch, making 
the gear the most important in the commercial fisheries. The annual growth rates of the catch in the 
commercial fisheries had been modest during the 1977-87 period indicating that commercial 
fisheries catch had already stabilized even back in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
9.1.3 Engine Horsepower in the Commercial Fisheries, 1948-87 
In past studies, fleet or engine horsepower was used as the measure of fishing effort (e.g. 
Ibid, p.4). Here it was also taken as the measure of fishing effort, but with some modifications. 
70 
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Table 4. Sources of Data for Commercial Fisheries, 1948-94 
Institution Publication Years Published 
BFAR Fisheries Statistics of the Philippines 1952-87 
BAS Fishery Statistics 1988·94 
BAS Commercial Fishery Production Statistics 1991·94 




-Total and by gear data, 1948-87 
-Total and by gear data, 1988 
-Total data, 1989-1992 
-Total and by gear data, 1993·94 
·Total and by gear data, 1993-94 
-Total and by gear data, 1988 
-Total data, 1989-1992 





- Horsepower data, 1978-87 
-Tonnage data, 1962-85 
- Number data, 1949-87 
- All data are total and by gear 
· No data on horsepower, 
tonnage and number for 
total and by gear 
-No data on horsepower, 
tonnage and number for 
total and by gear 
. No data on horsepower, 
tonnage and number for 
total and by gear 
I 
I Table 5. Catch In the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1948-87 (Metric Tons) 
I Purse Other All I Year Seine Gears Gears 
I 
1948 915 41,081 41,996 
1949 949 53,878 54 ,827 
1950 236 47,697 47,933 
1951 188 68,839 69,027 
I I 1952 580 72,735 73,315 1953 348 72,540 72,888 
1954 623 102,597 103,220 
I I 
1955 775 106,435 107,210 
1956 766 105,893 106,659 
1957 562 93,386 93,948 
1958 606 111,271 111 ,877 
I I 1959 406 117.412 117,818 1960 586 119.436 120,022 
1961 873 124,753 125,626 
I I 1962 953 149,083 150,036 1963 3 ,748 205,000 208,748 
1964 9,569 248,531 258,100 
1965 28,675 271 ,399 300,074 
I I 1966 25,701 289,198 314,899 1967 40,445 290,477 330,922 
1968 63,168 343,626 406,794 
I I 1969 80,050 288,677 368,727 1970 86,718 295,159 381 ,877 
1971 117,694 264,582 382,276 
I 
1972 148,454 276,300 424,754 
I 1973 232,587 232,835 465,422 1974 204,940 265,735 470,675 
1975 168,215 330,402 498,617 
I I 1976 211.417 296,780 508,197 1977 190,607 327,558 518,165 
1978 137,058 368,782 505 ,840 
I I 
1979 174,029 326,718 500,747 
1980 163,153 325,325 488,478 
1981 168,918 325,850 494 ,768 
1982 198,179 328,094 526,273 
I I 1983 212,979 306,337 519,316 1984 193,054 320,281 513,335 
1985 183,414 328,573 511,987 
I 
1986 224,730 321,500 546,230 
1987 239,663 351 ,529 591 ,192 
Ave. Annual 
I Growth Rate 0 .036 0.009 0.014 (1977-87) 






















As shown in Table 4, BF AR did not gather information on the engine horsepower for the 
entire 1948-87 period but instead, in the earlier years, gathered only data on the tonnage and/or 
number of gears. Due to the inconsistency, the engine horsepower data series was constructed based 
on the raw data on horsepower, tonnage and number of fishing vessels from BF AR. 
The actual procedure used here to construct engine horsepower was similar to those applied 
in previous works. First, for 1978-1987, the horsepower data were available from the source, but 
not on actual horsepower but only in ranges. In particular, the data were expressed in number of 
fishing vessels and gear type falling within horsepower ranges. The ranges were: Jess than 50 
horsepower, 50- 124 horsepower, 125-199 horsepower, 200-300 horsepower, and more than 300 
horsepower. 
To derive the horsepower series for the period 1978-1987, the midpoints of the middle ranges 
were multiplied by the corresponding number of the vessels falling within the ranges. For the 
outlying ranges, the numbers 50 and 300 were multiplied by the number of the vessels falling within 
the said ranges. 
Next, for the period 1962-1977, only the number of vessels and gross tonnage data were 
available. To generate a series, a linear regression, with zero intercept, was used to estimate 
relationship between gross tonnage and horsepower using the data for 1978-1987. The derived 
relationship were then_ used to estimate horsepower data for 1962-1977. 
For the period 1948-1961, only data on the number of fishing vessels were available. Thus, 
linear regression was again used to estimate the relationship between the gross tonnage and number 
of vessels using 1962-1987 data. The derived relationship was used to estimate the gross tonnage 
for 1948-1961. Then, horsepower data for the period 1948-1961 were measured using the earlier 
derived relationship between gross tonnage and horsepower for period 1978-1987. 
The resulting engine horsepower data series for purse seine, other gears and all gears are 
shown in Table 6. There has been a rapid rise in the total engine horsepower in commercial 
fisheries. The total horsepower in 1987 was more than twelve times the total horsepower in 1948. 
9.1.4 Catch in the Commercial Fisheries, 1988-94 
The BAS generated commercial fisheries catch data for period 1988-94 are shown in Table 
7. The average annual growth rates of the catch were much higher than those for 1977-87 based on 
BF AR data (see Table 5). This inconsistency occurred likely because with the change in the 
agencies generating the data, the procedures and methods used for the data gathering also changed. 
Consequently, this led to the overestimation of the commercial fisheries catch after 1988. This 
overestimation was also noted by Padilla and de Guzman (1994). 
Because of this problem, there was the need to readjust the data for the 1988-94 period so 
that the trend in the exploitation of fishery resources during the years before it was maintained. To 
73 
I 
I Table 6. Engine Horsepower In the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1948-87 
I 
Purse Other All 
I I Year Seine Gears Gears 
I 
1948 1,697 58,507 60,204 
1949 1,885 102,123 104,008 
1950 3,106 139,626 142,732 
1951 4 ,902 203,171 208,073 
I I 1952 6,599 252,520 259,119 1953 5,467 247,396 252,863 
1954 9,238 282,478 291,716 
I I 
1955 7,164 282,123 289,287 
1956 14,328 269,151 283,479 
1957 12,254 255,040 267,294 
1958 10,746 330,365 341,111 
I I 1959 14,517 348,820 363 ,337 1960 14,894 348,254 363 ,148 
1961 14,140 358,984 373,124 
I I 
1962 1,586 396,285 397,871 
1963 1,867 455 ,047 456,914 
1964 8,057 439,204 447,261 
1965 9,459 517,078 526,537 
I I 1966 17,795 607,147 624,942 1967 18,668 582,457 601 ,125 
1968 22,073 555,171 577,244 
I I 
1969 23 ,839 564,322 588,161 
1970 23,776 590,309 614 ,085 
1971 27,906 508,508 536,414 
1972 51 ,974 529,790 581,764 
I I 1973 107,887 605,137 713,024 1974 45 ,789 526,246 572,035 
1975 46,444 486,685 533 ,129 
I I 
1976 51,341 490,058 541 ,399 
1977 48,712 391,371 440,083 
1978 62,754 415,872 478,626 
1979 80,564 511,310 591 ,874 
I I 1980 81,808 520,377 602 ,185 1981 98,587 578,497 677,084 
1982 111,083 630,483 741 ,566 
I I 1983 95,186 691,183 786,369 1984 81 ,560 641,219 722,779 
1985 80,202 654,749 734,951 
I I 
1986 73,177 618,606 691,783 
1987 76,442 680,218 756,660 












































Source of Data: BAS (Various Years) . "Fishery Statistics". 


































do this, there were two options contemplated. First was to simply manipulate the catch for 1988-94, 
e.g. by using the average annual catch growth rate of the 1977-87 period with the 1987 catch as base 
figure. Second was to maintain the catch figures for 1988-94 from BAS and instead manipulate the 
effort figures for said period. 
Using the first option meant throwing away the BAS catch data altogether. To prevent this 
from occurring, the second option was applied. This is explained below. 
9.1.5 Engine Horsepower in the Commercial Fisheries, 1988-94 
As already cited, no data on which a measurement of the engine horsepower can be based 
were available after 1987. To address this problem, an initial approach taken was to gather 
painstakingly the unpublished horsepower data from BF AR files. The generated data set, however, 
was inconsistent at best (For instance, the derived horsepower figures did not match gains in catch 
reported after 1988 by BAS). Because of this, a decision was made not to use the data set. 
It then became necessary to extrapolate the engine horsepower data for the 1988-94 period. 
The procedure actually followed in doing this took account of the overestimated catch data after 
1987. First, for total commercial fisheries and for purse seine and other gears, annual catch to 
horsepower ratios from 1977-87 were computed based on the figures in Table 5. Second, the 
average rumual growth Fates of the ratios were determined. Third, the catch to horsepower ratios for 
1988-94 were estimated based on the average annual rate of growth of the ratios. Fourth, the annual 
engine horsepower for 1988-94 were computed by dividing the yearly catch by corresponding 
horsepower ratios for the period. 
The generated engine horsepowers for the 1988-94 period are provided in Table 8. It is 
obvious that similar to the catch data, the figures were overestimated. However, these horsepower 
figures ensure that even with the overestimated catch, the growth of the catch to horsepower ratio, 
which was an essential element in the analysis of overfishing, was consistently maintained for the 
whole period. 
9.1.6 Labor Horsepower in the Commercial Fisheries, 1948-94 
The fishing effort in commercial fisheries involves not only the engine input but the labor 
input as well. In past studies on overfishing, the labor input in commercial fisheries was ignored. 
In this study, the inclusion of labor input as component of fishing effort was made. 
Trinidad et al. (1993) estimated, based on a survey conducted in 1988, that the average crew 
of purse seiners were 67 people ru1d that for commercial fisheries as a whole were 24 people (Table 
9). When trru1slated to engine horsepower employing the ratio of Karim (1985), these inputs oflabor 


























































(a) To estimate , the average growth rate in the catch/horsepower ratios from 1977-87 was computed. This rate was 
then used to estimate catch/horsepower ratios for 1988-94. Lastly, the catch for 1988-94 in Table 4 were divided 
by the estimated catch/horsepower ratios to generate the horsepower values for 1988-94. 
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Table 9. Computation of Ratio of Labor Horsepower to Engine Horsepower in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries 
Average Conversion Average Labor Hp/ 
I I Gear Crew/Boat to Hp (a) Hp/Boat Engine Hp 
I 
Purse Seine 67 12.06 383 0.032 
Commercial 24 4.32 160 0.027 
Source of Basic Data: Trinidad et al. (1993) and Karim (1985} . Data were for 1988. 

























On the other hand, in 1988, the average engine horsepower of purse seiners was 388 while 
that of the whole commercial fisheries was 160. Therefore, the labor to engine horsepower ratio for 
purse seiners was .032 and that for commercial fisheries was .027. 
There were no available data that indicated any change in the ratio of labor to engine 
horsepower over time. Hence, these ratios were taken as constant over time to get the horsepower 
equivalent of the labor input. The total labor and engine horsepower for the period 1948-94 in the 
commercial fisheries sector are provided in Table 10. With the constant ratios, as in the case of the 
engine horsepower alone, engine plus labor horsepower has been increasing rapidly over the years 
also. 
9.1. 7 Learning Effects Adjusted Horsepower in the Commercial Fisheries, 1948-94 
In addition to engine and labor horsepower, engine and labor learning factors were taken as 
important components of the fishing effort in commercial fisheries. This was because improvements 
in the gears employed in the commercial fisheries were likely to have positive impacts on effective 
fishing effort. For instance, bigger and newer boats fish longer days. Furthermore, a more 
experienced crew likely works more hours on actual fishing than on other non-fishing related boat 
activities. 
Learning has ~ot been considered as part of fishing effort in most previous studies on 
overfishing. This was probably due to the difficulty encountered in actually measuring learning 
effects for the fisheries sector. Silvestre et al. (1986), however, generated learning factors for the 
trawl fisheries which was later used by Silvestre and Pauly (1987). These learning factors were 
provided in Table 11. 
In the absence of any other available measure for learning impacts in fishing, this study 
assumed that learning factors for trawl fishing apply for the commercial fisheries sector as a whole 
and for other gears (this was another unavoidable constraint of the study). Furthermore, it was 
assumed that learning factors equally apply for all the gears and crew. Table 12 provides the 
learning effects adjusted total engine and labor horsepower in commercial fisheries. 
9.1.8 Carrier Fleet Horsepower in the Commercial Fisheries, 1948-94 
The commercial carrier fleet are an important component of the commercial fisheries and 
must be imputed into the computation of total fishing effort also. Carriers are in use in the transport 
of purse seine catch as well as of other major commercial gear catch to minimize travel time from 
the fishing areas to the fish ports. The importance of the carrier fleets as part of commercial fishing 
effort was also recognized by Dalzell et al. (1987). 
There were few available data on the commercial carrier fleet from the BF AR and BAS 
publications. Therefore, to estimate carrier engine horsepower, data for 1964 to 1985 were directly 
lifted from Dalzell et al. (1987). Following said study, it was assumed that the level of carrier fleet 
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Table 10. Engine and Labor Horsepower in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1948-94 (a) 
Purse Other All 
Year Seine Gears Gears 
1948 1,751 60,078 61 ,830 
1949 1,945 104,871 106,816 
1950 3 ,205 143,380 146,586 
1951 5 ,059 208,632 213,691 
1952 6,810 259,305 266,115 
1953 5 ,642 254 ,048 259,690 
1954 9 ,534 290,059 299,592 
1955 7,393 289,705 297,098 
I I 1956 14,786 276,346 291 ,133 1957 12,646 261 ,865 274,511 
1958 11 ,090 339 ,231 350,321 
1959 14,982 358,166 373,147 
1960 15,371 357,582 372,953 
1961 14,592 368,606 383,198 
1962 1,637 406,977 408,614 
I I 1963 1,927 467,324 469,251 1964 8,315 451,022 459,337 1965 9 ,762 530,992 540,753 
1966 18,364 623,451 641,815 
I I 1967 19,265 598,090 617,355 1968 22,779 570,050 592 ,830 
1969 24 ,602 579,439 604 ,041 
I I 
1970 24 ,537 606,128 630,665 
1971 28,799 522 ,098 550,897 
1972 53 ,637 543 ,834 597,472 
1973 111,339 620,936 732,276 
I I 1974 47,254 540,226 587,480 1975 47,930 499,593 547,523 1976 52 ,984 503,033 556,017 
1977 50,271 401,694 451,965 
I I 1978 64,762 426,787 491 ,549 1979 83 ,142 524 ,713 607,855 
1980 84,426 534 ,018 618,444 
1981 101,742 593,623 695,365 
1982 114,638 646,951 761,588 
1983 98,232 709 ,369 807,601 
1984 84,170 658,124 742,294 
I I 1985 82 ,768 672,026 754,795 1986 75,519 634,942 710,461 
1987 78,888 698,202 777,090 
1988 86,603 731 ,611 818,215 
1989 95,186 806,240 901 ,426 
1990 104,620 923,684 1,028,304 
1991 114,988 1,042,079 1,157,067 
1992 126,384 1,145,218 1,271 ,603 
1993 138,910 1,246,834 1,385,744 
1994 130,572 1,375 ,147 1,505 ,719 




















Table 11. Learning Factors In the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1948-94 (a) 
Learning Learning 
Year Factor Year Factor 
1948 2.55 1972 1.25 
1949 2.55 1973 1.20 
1950 2.55 1974 1.16 
1951 2.55 1975 1.11 
1952 2.55 1976 1.07 
1953 2.55 1977 1.04 
1954 2.55 1978 1.00 
1955 2.55 1979 1.00 
1956 2.55 1980 1.00 
1957 2.55 1981 1.00 
1958 2.55 1982 1.00 
1959 2.55 1983 1.00 
1960 2.55 1984 1.00 
1961 2 .35 1985 1.00 
1962 2 .18 1986 1.00 
1963 2.03 1987 1.00 
1964 1.90 1988 1.00 
1965 1.78 1989 1.00 
1966 1.68 1990 1.00 
1967 1.59 1991 1.00 
1968 1.51 1992 1.00 
1969 1.44 1993 1.00 
1970 1.37 1994 1.00 
1971 1.31 
Source of Data: Table 8 of Silvestre et al. (1986). 
(a) The source provided learning factors up to 1981 . Factors tor 1982-94 were estimated to be the same as those for 
1978-81 . 
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Tabla 12. Learning Effects Adjusted Horsepower in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1948-94 (a) 
Purse Other All 
Year Seine Gears Gears 
1948 687 23 ,560 24 ,247 
1949 763 41 '126 41 ,889 
1950 1,257 56,228 57,485 
1951 1,984 81,817 83 ,800 
I I 
1952 2 ,671 101,688 104,359 
1953 2,213 99,627 101 ,839 
1954 3 ,739 113,749 117,487 
1955 2,899 113,610 116,509 
I I 1956 5,799 108,371 114,170 1957 4,959 102,692 107,651 
1958 4 ,349 133,032 137,381 
1959 5,875 140,457 146,332 
1960 6,028 140,228 146,256 
1961 6,210 156,854 163,063 
1962 751 186,687 187,437 
I I 
1963 949 230,209 231,158 
1964 4 ,376 237,380 241 ,756 
1965 5 ,484 298,310 303,794 
1966 10,931 371 ,102 382,033 
I I 1967 12,117 376,157 388,274 1968 15,086 377,517 392,602 
1969 17,085 402,389 419,473 
1970 17,910 442,430 460,340 
I I 1971 21,984 398,548 420,532 1972 42,910 435,068 477,977 
1973 92,783 517,447 610,230 
I I 
1974 40,736 465,712 506,448 
1975 43,1 80 450,084 493,264 
1976 49 ,518 470,124 519,642 
1977 48,337 386,245 434 ,582 
I I 1978 64 ,762 426,787 491 ,549 1979 83 ,142 524,713 607,855 
1980 84 ,426 534,018 618,444 
I I 
1981 101,742 593,623 695,365 
1982 114,638 646,951 761,588 
1983 98,232 709,369 807,601 
1984 84 ,170 658,124 742,294 
I I 
1985 82,768 672,026 754 ,795 
1986 75 ,519 634 ,942 710,461 
1987 78,888 698,202 777,090 
1988 86,603 731 ,611 818,215 
I I 1989 95,186 806,240 901,426 1990 104,620 923,684 1,028,304 
1991 114,988 1,042,079 1,157,067 
1992 126,384 1,145,218 1,271,603 
1993 138,910 1,246,834 1,385,744 
1994 130,572 1,375,147 1,505,719 













was insignificant prior to 1964. Then, the figures for carrier engine horsepower for 1986-94 were 
measured simply by applying on the data the average annual growth rate of total engine horsepower 
for the period 1988-94. 
The data for the carrier engine horsepower, carrier labor horsepower and total commercial 
fisheries carrier horsepower for 1948-94 are provided in Table 13. The figures for labor horsepower 
were generated by using the constant ratio of engine to labor horsepower derived earlier in Table 
9. 
The total carrier engine and labor horsepower in Table 13 were then adjusted for learning 
effects based on the learning factors provided in Table 11 . The resulting figures are shown in Table 
14. The figures for purse seine were estimated based on the computed annual ratios of purse seine 
catch to total catch (see Tables 5 and 7). 
9 .1. 9 Total Learning Adjusted Horsepower in the Commercial Fisheries, 1948-94 
Table 15 shows total horsepower in the commercial fisheries, inclusive of engine and labor 
inputs and adjusted for learning effects, for 1948-94. These figures represent the fishing effort in 
the commercial fisheries used by the study. 
9.1.1 0 Standardization of Fishing Effort Based on Purse Seine Efficiency 
In contrast to previous studies (e.g. Dalzell et a!. 1987), no standardization of the fishing 
effort of other gears based on purse seine efficiency was done in this study. The main reason for this 
is that standardization will lead to effort values for other gears which are different from actual 
values. Since actual effort is the one priced and paid for in the market, standardization will likely 
bias economic analysis by overpricing or underpricing total effort of other gears and of commercial 
fisheries as a whole. 
9.1 .11 Adjusted Catch, Effort and Catch/Effort in the Commercial Fisheries, 1948-94 
In Table 16, the total fish catch data from Tables 5 and 7 and the total fishing effort figures 
from Table 15 for the commercial fisheries are presented together. It was beforehand mentioned 
that fish catch data before 1965 were underestimated. To address this, a final adjustment of the catch 
data was done. 
To scale up the fish catch data before 1965, the following procedure was applied. First, 
CPUE for the period 1965-94 were computed (Table 16). Then, CPUE as the dependent variable 
was regressed against effort as independent variable using the exponential form (This form gave a 
better fit relative to the linear form). The results of regression are given in Table 17. Using the 
figures in Table 17, the estimated CPUE for the years 1948-64 were generated and multiplied by 
the corresponding effort to derive the adjusted yearly fish catch data for the period. The adjusted 



















Tabla 13. Carrier Engine and Labor Horsepower In Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1948-94 
Engine Labor Total 
Year Hp (a) Hp (b) Hp 
1948 0 0 0 
1949 0 0 0 
1950 0 0 0 
1951 0 0 0 
1952 0 0 0 
1953 0 0 0 
1954 0 0 0 
1955 0 0 0 
1956 0 0 0 
1957 0 0 0 
1958 0 0 0 
1959 0 0 0 
1960 0 0 0 
1961 0 0 0 
1962 0 0 0 
1963 0 0 0 
1964 6,005 162 6,167 
1965 11 ,167 302 11 ,469 
1966 16,325 441 16,766 
1967 52,516 1,418 53,934 
1968 24,771 669 25,440 
1969 28,165 760 28,925 
1970 32,383 874 33,257 
1971 51,546 1,392 52,938 
1972 92 ,523 2,498 95,021 
1973 28,261 763 29 ,024 
1974 128,955 3,482 132,437 
1975 116,990 3,159 120,149 
1976 119,111 3,216 122,327 
1977 116,291 3,140 119,431 
1978 84,133 2,272 86,405 
1979 101,485 2,740 104,225 
1980 153,200 4,136 157,336 
1981 199,571 5,388 204,959 
1982 214,337 5,787 220,124 
1983 241,717 6,526 248,243 
1984 221 ,504 5,981 227,485 
1985 242,062 6,536 248,598 
1986 266,268 7,189 273,457 
1987 292 ,895 7,908 300,803 
1988 322 ,185 8,699 330,884 
1989 354,403 9,569 363,972 
1990 389,843 10,526 400,369 
1991 428,828 11 ,578 440,406 
1992 471,710 12,736 484,447 
1993 518,881 14,010 532,891 
1994 570,770 15,411 586,180 
(a) Data on carrier horsepower were lifted from Dalzell et at. Data for 1986 to 1994 were estimated 
based on average annual growth rate of total engine horsepower of .1 0 percent from 1988-94. 




I Tab le15. Learning Adjusted Total Horsepower In the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1948-94 
Purse Other All 
I 
I Year Seine Gears Gears 
1948 687 23 ,560 24 ,247 
I 1949 763 41 ,126 41 ,889 1950 1,257 56,228 57,485 
1951 1,984 81 ,817 83,800 
I 
1952 2,671 101 ,688 104,359 
I 1953 2,213 99,627 101 ,839 1954 3 ,739 113,749 117,487 
1955 2,899 113,610 116,509 
I I 
1956 5,799 108,371 114,170 
1957 4 ,959 102,692 107,651 
1958 4,349 133,032 137,381 
1959 5,875 140,457 146,332 
I I 1960 6,028 140,228 146,256 1961 6 ,210 156,854 163,063 
1962 751 186,687 187,437 
1963 949 230,209 231,158 
1964 4 ,497 240,506 245 ,002 
1965 6,100 304 ,137 310,237 
1966 11 ,746 380,267 392,013 
I I 1967 16,262 405,932 422,195 1968 17,702 391,748 409 ,450 
1969 21,445 418,115 439,560 
I I 
1970 23 ,423 461 ,192 484 ,615 
1971 34 ,425 426,517 460,943 
1972 69,478 484 ,516 553 ,994 
1973 104 ,870 529,547 634,416 
I I 1974 90,448 530,170 620,618 1975 79 ,697 521 ,809 601 ,506 
1976 97,078 536,888 633,966 
1977 90,580 458,839 549 ,419 
I I 1978 88,174 489,780 577,953 1979 119,364 592,715 712 ,080 
1980 136,977 638,804 775 ,780 
I I 
1981 171 ,717 728,608 900,325 
1982 197,530 784,182 981 ,712 
1983 200,040 855,804 1,055,844 
1984 169,722 800,057 969 ,779 
1985 171 ,826 831 ,566 1,003,392 
1986 188,025 795 ,894 983 ,919 
1987 200,831 877,062 1,077,893 
I I 
1988 231 ,884 917,214 1,149,098 
1989 260,805 1,004,593 1,265,398 
1990 286,960 1,141 ,713 1,428,673 
1991 318,510 1,278,963 1,597,473 
I 1992 358,970 1,397,079 1,756,049 1993 406,960 1,511 ,675 1,918,635 






I Tabla 16. Unadjusted Catch, Effort and Catch/ Effort in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1948-94 
I 
Year Catch Effort Catch/Effort 
(Mt) (Hp)(a) 
I 1948 41 ,996 
24,247 1.7320 
1949 54,827 41,889 1.3089 
1950 47,933 57,485 0.8338 
1951 69 ,027 83 ,800 0.8237 
I 1952 73 ,315 104,359 0.7025 1953 72 ,888 101 ,839 0.7157 
1954 103,220 117,487 0.8786 
I 
1955 107,210 116,509 0.9202 
1956 106,659 114,1 70 0.9342 
1957 93 ,948 107,651 0.8727 
1958 111 ,877 137,381 0.8144 
I 1959 117,818 146,332 0.8051 1960 120,022 146,256 0.8206 
1961 125,626 163,063 0.7704 
1962 150,036 187,437 0.8005 
I 1963 208,748 231 ,158 0.9031 1964 258,100 245,002 1.0535 
1965 300,074 310,237 0.9672 
I 
1966 314,899 392,013 0.8033 
1967 330,922 422 ,195 0.7838 
1968 406,794 409,450 0.9935 
1969 368,727 439 ,560 0.8389 
I 
1970 381 ,877 484 ,615 0.7880 
1971 382 ,276 460,943 0.8293 
1972 424,754 553,994 0.7667 
1973 465 ,422 634 ,4 16 0.7336 
I 1974 470,675 620,618 0 .7584 1975 498,617 601 ,506 0 .8289 
1976 508,197 633 ,966 0 .8016 
I 
1977 518,1 65 549 ,419 0.9431 
1978 505 ,840 577,953 0.8752 
1979 500,747 712 ,080 0.7032 
1980 488,478 775,780 0.6297 
1981 494 ,768 900,325 0.5495 
1982 526,273 981 ,712 0.5361 
1983 519,316 1,055,844 0.4918 
1984 513 ,335 969 ,779 0.5293 
I 1985 511,987 1,003,392 0.5103 1986 546,230 983,919 0.5552 
1987 591 ,192 1,077,893 0.5485 
I 
1988 599,995 1,149,098 0.5221 
1989 637,138 1,265,398 0.5035 
1990 700,564 1,428,673 0.4904 
1991 759,815 1,597,473 0.4756 
I 
1992 804 ,866 1,756,049 0.4583 
1993 845,431 1,918,635 0.4406 
1994 885 ,446 2,091 ,899 0.4233 
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Table 17. Regression Results for Catch/Effort and Effort In the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1965-94 
Specification 
Catch/Effort = a effort exp(b) 
or 














I Table 18. Final Ca tch, Effort and Catch/ Effort in the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1948-94 
Year Catch Effort Catch/Effort 
(Mt) (Hp) I 
1948 85,653 24 ,247 3.5325 
1949 113,310 41 ,889 2.7050 I 
1950 133,235 57,485 2.3177 
1951 161 ,584 83,800 1.9282 
1952 180,787 104,359 1.7324 
1953 178,539 101 ,839 1 .7531 I 
1954 192,090 117,487 1.6350 
1955 191 ,270 116,509 1 .6417 
1956 189,295 114,170 1 .6580 
1957 183,684 107,651 1 .7063 I 
1958 208,102 137,381 1.5148 
1959 214 ,935 146,332 1.4688 
1960 214 ,877 146,256 1.4692 I 
1961 227,180 163,063 1.3932 
1962 243,969 187,437 1 .3016 
1963 271,604 231 ,158 1 .1750 
1964 279,811 245,002 1.1421 I 
1965 300,074 310,237 0 .9672 
1966 314,899 392,013 0.8033 
1967 330,922 422,195 0 .7838 
1968 406,794 409,450 0 .9935 
I 
1969 368,727 439 ,560 0 .8389 
1970 381 ,877 484,615 0.7880 
1971 382,276 460,943 0.8293 I 
1972 424,754 553 ,994 0 .7667 
1973 465,422 634,416 0 .7336 
1974 470,675 620,618 0 .7584 
1975 498,617 601 ,506 0.8289 I 
1976 508,197 633,966 0.8016 
1977 518,165 549 ,419 0 .9431 
1978 505,840 577,953 0 .8752 
1979 500,747 712,080 0 .7032 
I 
1980 488,478 775 ,780 0 .6297 
1981 494,768 900,325 0 .5495 
1982 526,273 981 ,712 0 .5361 I 
1983 519,316 1,055 ,844 0 .4918 
1984 513,335 969,779 0 .5293 
1985 511,987 1,003 ,392 0.5103 
1986 546,230 983,919 0 .5552 
1987 591 ,192 1 ,077,893 0 .5485 
1988 599,995 1,149,098 0 .5221 
1989 637,138 1,265,398 0 .5035 I 
1990 700,564 1,428,673 0.4904 
1991 759,815 1,597,473 0.4756 
1992 804,866 1 ,756,049 0 .4583 
1993 845,431 1,918,635 0 .4406 I 






















9.1.12 Adjusted Catch, Effort and Catch/Effort for Purse Seine and Other Commercial Gears, 1948-
94 
Following the san1e approach, the unadjusted catch, effort and catch per unit effort for purse 
seine and other gears were gathered (Table 19). Then, the catch prior to 1965 were adjusted 
employing the same approach applied above. 
For purse seine, CPUE as dependent variable was regressed against effort as independent 
variable using the exponential form (Table 20). Then, the estimated CPUE for 1948-64 were had 
and multiplied by effort to get the adjusted fish catch data for said years. The adjusted fish catch, 
fishing effort and CPUE are shown in given in Table 21. The catch and effort data for other gears 
were simply measured as the difference between the catch and effort for total gears and purse seine. 
9 .I. 13 Prices of Fish Catch and Cost of Fishing Effort in the Commercial Fisheries, 1994 
As cited earlier, the price of fish and the cost of fishing effort were assumed constant in the 
analysis for reasons already mentioned. The price of commercial fish per metric ton for 1994 was 
generated by averaging the market wholesale prices for major commercial fish species (Table 22). 
On the other hand, the cost of effort was estimated by taking the average of the price of effort 
for purse seine, trawl, bagnet and ringnet generated by the survey undertaken by Trinidad et al. 
(1993) in 1988. The average figure was scaled upward, to 1994, by employing the average inflation 
rate in the Philippines (The use of the average inflation rate, compared to other input specific price 
indeces, was deemed superior because of the diversity of the actual inputs comprising fishing effort). 
The computation of the cost of fishing effort are given in Tables 23. 
9.2 Data for Municipal Fisheries 
9.2.1 Data Sources for Municipal Fisheries 
This study use secondary time-series data for the municipal fisheries covering the period 
1948-1994. The sources were BF AR, BAS and Dalzell et al. (1987). 
Table 24 shows that "Fisheries Statistics of the Philippines" only has municipal catch data 
for 1976-87 and no effort data. On the other hand, "Fishery Statistics" has data for later years but 
has no data on effort. Dalzell eta!. has data on municipal small pelagic catch for the period 1948-85 
from which the total municipal catch data can be estimated. It also has data on horsepower for the 
municipal fisheries for the same period. 
9.2.2 Catch in the Municipal Fisheries, 1948-94 
The catch data series for the municipal fisheries sector for the period 1948-94 is shown in 
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Table 20. Regression Results for Catch/Effort and Effort for Purse Seine, 1965-94 
Specification a 
Catch/Effort = a effort exp(b) 144.46 
or 
Log(Catch/Effort) = log (a) + b log (Effort) 
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(a) From the National Statistics Office . 




















(b) 1988 figure was derived from Trinidad (Personal Communications) based on a 1988 survey. The figure 
was average for purse seine , trawl , bagnet and ringnet. 1989-94 figures were computed based on the 
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Table 24. Sources of Data for Municipal Fisheries, 1948-94 
Institution Publication 
BFAR Fisheries Statistics of the Philippines 
BAS Fishery Statistics 
ICLARM Dalzell et al. 
- - - - -
Nature of 
Years Published Catch Data 
1952-87 - Total data, 1976-87 
1988-94 - Total data, 1988-94 
1987 - No total data 




























Table 25. Catch, Effort and Catch/Effort in the Philippine Municipal Fisheries, 1948-94 
Catch(a) Effort(b) Catch/ 
Year (Mt) (Hp) Effort(c) 
1948 130,052 45 ,258 2.87 
1949 158,669 54 ,899 2.89 
1950 146,793 61 ,197 2.40 
1951 197,393 68,220 2.89 
1952 208,706 76,053 2.74 
1953 199,266 84 ,789 2.35 
1954 205,371 94 ,534 2.17 
1955 218,983 105,403 2.08 
1956 248,509 117,528 2.11 
1957 253 ,808 131 ,051 1.94 
1958 257,1 66 146,139 1.76 
1959 260,573 162,969 1.60 
1960 264 ,481 181 ,748 1.46 
1961 268,448 202 ,689 1.32 
1962 272,475 226,055 1.21 
1963 276,562 252 ,124 1.10 
1964 282 ,726 281,208 1.01 
1965 303 ,930 313 ,657 0.97 
1966 326, 725 349 ,862 0.93 
1967 351 ,229 390,256 0.90 
1968 444 ,179 435 ,326 1.02 
1969 477,492 485 ,614 0.98 
1970 510,546 768,673 0.66 
1971 542,904 604 ,336 0.90 
1972 598,733 674 ,199 0.89 
1973 639 ,795 752 ,154 0.85 
1974 684 ,498 839 ,143 0.82 
1975 731 ,725 936,2 11 0.78 
1976 619 ,145 1,044 ,531 0 .59 
1977 712 ,514 936,115 0.76 
1978 775,932 1,300,017 0 .60 
1979 635,543 1,450,905 0 .44 
1980 647,284 1,559,870 0.41 
1981 709,989 1,806,252 0.39 
1982 708,016 2,015 ,449 0.35 
1983 770,988 2,248,911 0.34 
1984 789,975 2,509,457 0.31 
1985 785,132 2,800,208 0.28 
1986 807,275 3,152,262 0.26 
1987 816,247 3 ,489 ,601 0.23 
1988 838,346 3 ,924,015 0.21 
1989 882 ,369 4 ,521,795 0.20 
1990 895,040 5 ,021 ,765 0.18 
1991 913 ,524 5,611,605 0.16 
1992 854 ,687 5,748,142 0.15 
1993 803,194 5,914,174 0.14 
1994 786,847 6,343,329 0.12 
(a) Data for 1948-75 were extrapolated from Dalzell et al. (1987) based on the estimate that small pelagic catch was 38 
percent of municipal catch. Data for rest of the years came from published BFAR and BAS sources. 
(b) Data for 1948-85 came from Dalzell et al. (1987). Those for later years were extrapolated by dividing the catch data 
by the catch/effort data for each year. 
(c) Data for 1986-94 were extrapolated by first getting the average annual growth rate of catch/effort for period 1975-85. 





















catch in small pelagics comprised 38 percent of total municipal catch. The catch data for the latter 
years were simply lifted from the BFAR and BAS publications. 
9.2.3 Adjustment in the Municipal Fisheries Catch Data 
Unlike in the commercial fisheries, there was no report of an underestimation of the 
municipal catch prior to 1965. Also, there was no sign of overestimation of the BAS data for 1988 
and beyond as these appeared consistent with those for previous years. Hence the study also did not 
adjust for underestimation or overestimation of catch data. 
9.2.4 Effort in the Municipal Fisheries, 1948-94 
Table 25 also shows the fishing effort in municipal fisheries, measured in terms of 
horsepower. The data for 1948-85 were lifted directly from Dalzell et al. and were the total of 
engine and labor horsepower. The figures for 1988-94 were estimated by getting the average rumual 
growth rate of catch per unit effort for 1975-85 and then using this rate and the catch figures for the 
latter years to extrapolate both the catch per unit effort and effort. 
9.2.5 Adjustment in the Municipal Fishing Effort Data 
The effort data from Dalzell et al. already includes both the engine and labor horsepower and, 
hence, a further adjustment along this line was no longer necessary. There were no data indicating 
learning effects over time in municipal fishing and this prevented an adjustment related to learning. 
Lastly, the municipal fishermen in general use their catcher boats_ to also haul the catch to shore. 
Thus, no adjustment related to the use of carrier boats was needed. 
9.2.6 Prices of Fish Catch and Cost of Fishing Effort in the Municipal Fisheries, 1994 
The price of fish from municipal waters per metric ton for 1994 was generated by averaging 
the market wholesale prices of the more popular municipal fish species (Table 26). 
There is no available data that can be used to estimate the cost of effort in the municipal 
fisheries. In this work, it was simply assumed that this cost was one-half that of the commercial 
fisheries. 
9.3 Data for Total Marine Fisheries 
9.3.1 Data for Total Marine Fisheries Catch and Effort, 1948-94 
The data for the total marine fisheries for catch and effort were simply the summation of the 





































I Tab le 27 . Catch, Effort and Catch/Effort In the Phil ippine Marine Fisheries, 1948-94 
I 
Year Catch Effort Catch/Effort 
(Mt) (Hp) 
I I 1948 215,705 69,505 3 .1034 1949 271 ,979 96,788 2.8101 
1950 280,028 118,682 2.3595 
I I 
1951 358,977 152,020 2 .3614 
1952 389 ,493 180,412 2.1589 
1953 377,805 186,628 2.0244 
1954 397,461 212,021 1.8746 
I I 1955 410,253 221 ,912 1.8487 1956 437,804 231 ,698 1.8895 
1957 437,492 238,702 1.8328 
1958 465 ,268 283,520 1.6410 
I I 1959 475 ,508 309,301 1.5374 1960 479 ,358 328,004 1.4614 
1961 495 ,628 365 ,752 1.3551 
I I 
1962 516,444 413,492 1.2490 
1963 548,166 483,282 1.1343 
1964 562,537 526,210 1.0690 
1965 604,004 623 ,894 0.9681 
I I 1966 641 ,624 741 ,875 0.8649 1967 682,151 812 ,451 0.8396 
1968 850,973 844,776 1.0073 
1969 846,219 925,174 0.9147 
I I 1970 892 ,423 1,253,288 0.7121 1971 925 ,180 1,065,279 0.8685 
1972 1,023,487 1,228,193 0.8333 
I I 
1973 1,105,217 1,386,570 0.7971 
1974 1 ,155,173 1,459,761 0.7913 
1975 1,230,342 1,537,717 0.8001 
1976 1,127,342 1,678,497 0.6716 
I I 1977 1,230,679 1,485,534 0.8284 1978 1,281,772 1,877,970 0.6825 
1979 1,1 36,290 2,162,985 0.5253 
I 
1980 1,1 35,762 2,335,650 0.4863 
I 1981 1,204 ,757 2,706,577 0 .4451 1982 1,234,289 2,997,161 0 .4118 
1983 1,290,304 3 ,304 ,755 0.3904 
I I 
1984 1,303,310 3,479,236 0.3746 
1985 1,297,119 3,803 ,600 0.3410 
1986 1,353 ,505 4,136,181 0.3272 
1987 1,407,439 4,567,494 0.3081 
I I 1988 1,438,341 5,073,114 0.2835 1989 1,519 ,507 5,787,193 0.2626 
1990 1,595 ,604 6,450,438 0.2474 
I I 
1991 1,673,339 7,209,079 0.2321 
1992 1,659,553 7,504 ,191 0.2212 
1993 1,648,625 7,832 ,810 0.2105 
























9.3.2 Data for the Marine Fisheries Catch, by Species, 1976-87 
For the analysis on overfishing of individual species, catch data for the top 35 species caught 
in the marine fisheries were gathered (Table 28). These include Acetes, Anchovies, Barracuda, Big-
Eyed Scad, Caesio, Cavalla, Crab, Crevalle, Croaker, Eastern Little Tuna, Flying Fish, Frigate Tuna, 
Garfish, goatfish, Grouper, Hairtail, Herring, Indian Mackerel, Indo-Pacific Mackerel, Lizard Fish, 
Mullet, Porgies, Prawn, Round Scad, Sardine, Shrimp, Siganid, Skipjack, Slipmouth, Snapper, 
Spanish Mackerel, Squid, Treadfin Breams, White Shrimp and Yellowfin Tuna. 
The reliable time-series data on marine fisheries catch by the species covers the period 1976-
87 only. The source of data was the "Fisheries Statistics of the Philippines" of the BFAR. The data 
on species catch for latter years coming from BAS were not utilized because of possible 
overestimation. Also, adjustment of the BAS catch data by species, as conducted for total 
commercial fisheries, cannot be done since data on fishing effort by species were not available. 
9.3.3 Prices ofFish Catch and Cost ofFishing Effort in the Marine Fisheries, 1994 
The price of the fish from all marine waters per metric ton for 1994 was generated by 
averaging the market wholesale prices of the commercial and municipal fisheries (Table 29). 
There was no _available data useful for measuring the cost of effort in the whole marine 
fisheries sector. Thus, it was assumed that this amount is three-fourths that of the commercial 
fisheries. 
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Table 28. Catch of Specific Species In the Philippine Marine Fisheries, 1976-87 
Year Acetes Anchovies Barracuda Big-eyed Sea Butterfly Caesio Cavalla Crab 
1976 7,230 55,305 3,111 30,101 320 9,836 12,380 8,293 
1977 6,284 36,217 4 ,604 33,232 131 6,397 20,117 7,697 
1978 6,521 44,873 4 ,525 26,902 323 8,112 12,643 8,243 
1979 5,409 47,983 3,041 29,545 315 6,501 12,621 13.424 
1980 8,945 60.409 2,772 30,089 36 10,228 12,811 8,946 
1981 19,360 53,522 5,033 19,621 160 8,684 14,803 12,878 
1982 25,686 47,777 4,415 15,710 142 9,878 23 ,596 9,752 
1983 9,924 65,995 5,398 14,765 127 9,604 12,353 23 ,622 
1984 7,554 63,387 4,403 20,717 144 6,950 19,044 13,553 
1985 17,455 70,781 5,861 20,390 119 6,669 19,239 12,289 
1986 16,614 68,978 8,156 20,092 149 6,008 17,574 14,026 




Eastern Flying Frigate 
Year Crevalle Croaker Little Tuna Eels Flatfish Fish Mackerel Garfish 
1976 5,779 9,336 18,906 483 367 10,919 22,227 3.456 
1977 9,962 2,865 40.455 2931 1,071 14,702 31 ,689 6,022 
1978 6,761 2,551 26,873 1026 1,034 11 ,889 30,002 4,567 
1979 9,615 2,644 15,825 381 1,155 10,929 40,215 6.435 
1980 6,510 2.492 14,772 551 912 16,647 43,564 4 ,524 
1981 7,116 4,097 17,820 596 770 31 ,035 31,107 8.412 
1982 7,171 4,060 32,082 761 2,207 21,530 27,501 7,637 
1983 12,262 4,076 36.421 855 1,049 14.444 40,122 10,965 
1984 10,794 7,200 23,067 1123 1,060 24,323 32,945 12,198 
1985 11 ,071 7,723 22,387 1058 1,127 20,610 42,240 13,354 
1986 9,853 9,325 22,097 1337 700 17,013 43,029 9,115 
1987 10,902 7,010 24,321 1683 1,541 17,784 40,362 9,188 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Table 28. Catch of Specific Species In the Philippine Marine Fisheries , 1976-87 (Continued) 
Indian Indo-Pacific 
Year Gizzard Sha Goatfish Herring Mackerel Mackerel Grouper Milkfish Mullet 
1976 543 3 .671 37,216 10.729 17,036 14,463 2,317 4 ,626 
1977 552 8,051 43,505 19,469 13,692 17,364 358 5 ,285 
1978 264 5,968 2 1,086 22.144 10,938 12,371 411 7,552 
1979 264 7.750 8,499 24 ,735 1,614 15,655 982 7.823 
1980 372 6,488 17.513 11 ,639 12,745 15,234 163 6,865 
1981 150 8 ,042 18,328 13,992 9,051 18,637 195 6,052 
1982 606 7 ,188 13,663 10,802 10,933 15,990 77 7,662 
1983 629 8,566 12,745 14,411 13.803 16,423 599 6.194 
1984 760 16,417 23,118 15,817 15,898 23 ,014 580 12,166 
1985 913 18,398 18,078 18,599 14,016 23 ,547 176 10,667 
1986 880 14,556 18,349 18,151 13,871 27,408 704 12,098 





Year Prawns Round Scad Sardine Shark Shrimp Siganids Skipjack Slipmouth 
1976 275 39,666 43,098 4.883 20,307 5,164 19,358 30,837 
1977 448 26,067 96,673 4 ,604 10,455 7,738 32 ,571 21 ,236 
1978 1,160 27,583 102,700 3,876 9,281 8,358 34,914 22,014 
1979 1,295 31,338 68,931 3,608 9,992 10,905 25,258 23 ,952 
1980 1,064 20,813 79,446 3 ,702 9,757 7 ,196 18,692 20,895 
1981 2,125 29,090 86,771 7,545 11 ,784 9,715 20,733 21 ,925 
1982 1,712 32 ,987 92,517 5,593 11 ,693 19,257 19,612 23,048 
1983 2,802 33 ,762 92,377 4,661 10,905 13,461 17,538 28,218 
1984 1,547 26,570 70,467 5,817 9,425 15,899 15,800 36,269 
1985 1,578 25,446 49,580 5,490 10,878 16,010 18,103 35 ,154 
1986 1,469 24,557 45,031 9,386 14,770 12,752 25,253 37,580 
1987 2,176 30,352 55,628 5 ,709 10,253 12,077 26,060 40,317 
------ ----------
Table 28. Catch of Specific Species in the Philippine Marine Fisheries, 1976-87 (Continued) 
Spanish Sword Fish Thread fin White Yellowfin Spadefish 
Year Snapper Mackerel Squid Breams Shrimp Tuna 
1976 9,015 7,513 13,079 1,558 26,584 20,307 31 ,633 229 
1977 9,145 6,684 12,784 2,102 19,814 10,455 50,799 322 
1978 9,701 7,779 10,016 848 14,279 9,281 41 ,510 583 
1979 14,294 11 ,415 13,665 3,820 16,167 9,992 37,817 880 
1980 15,791 9,664 13,235 1,715 19,956 9,757 36,527 636 
1981 16,430 11,736 17,813 1,936 25,726 11 ,784 36,103 524 
1982 13,519 15,399 12,000 3,114 20,562 11 ,693 32,135 1,354 
1983 14,228 14,604 19,718 2,959 24,383 10,905 41 ,529 1,972 
1984 16,801 9,577 10,005 2,272 28,707 9,425 36,670 1,482 
1985 18,814 10,539 16,127 2,035 31 ,011 10,878 42,108 1,558 













































RESULTS OF ESTIMATION 
10.1 Results for Commercial Fisheries 
1 0.1.1 Estimation of the GS and Fox Models for Commercial Fisheries 
The results of the estimation of the biological specification of the GS and Fox models are 
provided in Table 30. As seen, the GS model had a higher adjusted coefficient of multiple 
determination. Both models generated the expected signs and significance for the coefficients 
suggesting that commercial fisheries are overfished. 
I 0.1.2 Maximum Sustainable, Maximum Economic and Open Access Levels in Commercial 
Fisheries 
Using the results of the GS model in Table 21 and the values for the price of fish and cost 
ofefTort in Tables 22 and 23, the MEY, Erney, MSY, Emsy, OA Y and Eoay levels were computed 
(Tables 31 and 32). As indicated, MSY was at 785,706 metric tons valued at P39.084 billion and 
produced at the effort l~vel of 1 ,833,191 horsepower. When these estimated values were compared 
with catch and effort values in Table 18, the MSY level appeared to have occured back in the early 
nineties. 
The MEY, on the other hand, was at 674,476 metric tons valued at P33.550 billion and 
produced at the etTort level of 1,143,447 horsepower. Comparing with the figures in Table 18, this 
level appeared to have been attained back in the late eighties and early nineties. 
The OA Y was at 737,579 metric tons valued at P36.687 billion and produced at effort level 
of 2,286,894 horsepower. Comparing with figures in Table 18, This level has yet to happen, 
implying that with open access, further expansion of the sector will likely occur. 
The results of estimation of the GS model of the commercial fisheries are illustrated in 
Figure 14. 
1 0.1.3 Economic Rent in Commercial Fisheries 
The computed total revenues, total costs and economic rents using the results of the GS 
model are also provided in Tables 31 and 32. The maximum economic rent that will be generated 
when the commercial fisheries is operated at MEY level is P15.205 billion per year (see Figure 14). 
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Table 30. Regression Results for the Gordon-Schaefer and Fox Models In the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1948-94 
Specification (a) Model a1 
Catch = a 1 Effort + a2 Effort2 Gordon-Schaefer .8572* 
(21.676) 
Catch = Effort Exp(a1 + a2 Effort) Fox .4588* 
(7 .760) 
Figures in parenthesis are t-values . * means significant at the 1 percent level. 
(a) Catch and effort are in quantity terms . 
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Table 31. Key Indicators Using the Gordon-Schaefer Model Results In the Philippine Commercial Fisheries, 1994 
Volume of Catch Total Revenues Amount of Effort Total Costs Economic Rent 
Indicator (Metric Tons) (Pesos) (Horsepower) (Pesos) (Pesos) 
Maximum Sustainable point 785,706 39,082,565,981 1,833,191 29,409,879,384 9,672 ,686,597 
Maximum Economic Point 674,476 33 ,549,785,675 1,143,447 18,344 ,318,773 15,205,466,902 
Open Access Point 737,579 36,688,637,546 2,286,894 36,688,637,546 0 
- - - - - - - - - - -
T•ble 32. E•tim•ted Totel Revenue• •nd Totel Coet• •t Different level• of Effort in the Philippine Commerci•l Fi•herie• BaMd on the Gordon-Schaefer Model 
Effort Catch Total Revenues Total Costs Economic Rent 
0 0 0 0 0 
tOO,OOO 83,382 4,147,587,444 1 ,604,300,000 2,543,287,444 
200,000 162,088 8,062,581 ,296 3,208,600,000 4,853,981 ,296 
300,000 236,118 11 ,744,981 ,558 4,812,900,000 6,932,081 ,556 
400,000 305,472 15,194,788,224 6,417,200,000 8, 777,588,224 
500,000 370,150 18,412,001 ,300 8,021 ,500,000 10,390,501 ,300 
600,000 430,152 21 ,396,620, 784 9,625,800,000 11 ,770,820,784 
700,000 485,478 24,148,646,676 11 ,230, 100,000 12,918,546,676 
800,000 536,128 26,668,078,976 12,834,400,000 13,833,678,976 
900,000 582,102 28,954,917,684 14,438,700,000 14,516,217,684 
1,000,000 623,400 31,009,162,800 16,043,000,000 14,966,162,800 
1,100,000 660,022 32,830,814,324 17,647,300,000 15,183,514,324 
1,143,447 674,476 33,549,787,123 18,344,320,221 15,205,466,902 
1,200,000 691 ,968 34,419,872,258 19,251 ,600,000 15,168,272,258 
1,300,000 719,238 35,776,336,596 20,855,900,000 14,920,436,596 
1,400,000 741 ,832 36,900,207,344 22,460,200,000 14,440,007,344 
1,500,000 759,750 37,791 ,484,500 24,064,500,000 13,726,984,500 
1,600,000 772,992 38,450,168,064 25,668,800,000 12,781,368,064 
gl 1,700,000 781 ,558 36,876,258,036 27,273,100,000 11 ,603, 158,036 1,800,000 785,448 39,069,754,416 28,877,400,000 10,192,354,416 
1,833,191 785,706 39,082,565,981 29,409,879,384 9,672,686,597 
1,900,000 784,662 39,030,657,204 30,481,700,000 8,548,957,204 
2,000,000 779,200 38,758,966,400 32,088,000,000 6,672,966,400 
2,100,000 769,062 38,254,682,004 33,690,300,000 4,584,382,004 
2,200,000 754,248 37,517,804,016 35,294,600,000 2,223,204,016 
2,286,894 737,579 36,688,637,546 36,688,637 ,546 (0) 
2,300,000 734,758 36,548,332,436 36,898,900,000 (350,587,564) 
2,400,000 710,592 35,346,267,264 38,503,200,000 (3, 158,932, 736) 
2,500,000 681 ,750 33,91 1 ,608,500 40,107,500,000 (6, 195,891 ,500) 
2,600,000 648,232 32,244,358,144 41,711 ,800,000 (9,467,443,858) 
2,700,000 610,038 30,344,510,196 43,316,100,000 (12,971 ,589,804) 
2,800,000 587,168 28,212,070,658 44,920,400,000 (1 6, 708,329,344) 
2,900,000 519,622 25,847,037,524 46,524,700,000 (20,677,662,476) 





Figure 14. Results of the Estimation of the Gordon-Schaefer 
Model for the Commercial Fisheries, 1948-1994 
Billion Pesos 
MSY 
























Expressed in terms of quantity at the 1994 average fish price ofP49,742 per metric ton, the 
maximum economic rent that can be had from the commercial fisheries per year amount to 305,677 
metric tons. 
The above estimate of the amount of the maximum economic rent from commercial fisheries, 
in general, is consistent with results of previous studies. Dalzell et al. (1987) measured that 
maximum economic rent from small pelagic fisheries was about 366,000 metric tons. On the other 
hand, Silvetre and Pauly ( 1986) estimated the maximum economic rent from the demersal fisheries 
at approximately 125,000 to 200,000 metric tons or 162,500 metric tons on average per year. When 
summed up, the maximum economic rent from the small pelagic and demersal fisheries was at 
528,500 metric tons. 
Little is known about how much of small pelagic and demersal catch came from conunercial 
fisheries. However, the average share of commercial fisheries catch to total marine fisheries catch 
in the last five years was 4 7 percent (BAS, Various Years). Using this as a rough basis, then the 
commercial fisheries share of the maximum economic rent coming from the small pelagic and 
demersal fisheries was about 248,395 metric tons a year. 
There is no information about the maximum economic rent from large pelagic fisheries, 
much less about the portion of this that goes to commercial fisheries. On the other hand, it can be 
assumed that the diff~rence between the figure of 248,395 metric tons from past studies and the 
figure of305,677 metric tons computed by this study represents the economic rent from large pelagic 
fisheries. 
1 0.1.4 Required Reduction of Fishing Eff01i in Commercial Fisheries 
Based on the results, fishing effort needs to be reduced from the 1994 level of 2,091,899 
horsepower (Table 18). In percentage terms, effort in the commercial fisheries sector will have to 
be reduced by about 45 percent to arrive at MEY. To attain the MSY, on the other hand, it will have 
to be lowered by approximately 12 percent. 
1 0.1.5 Estimation of the GS and Fox Models for Purse Seine and Other Commercial Fishing Gears 
To see if overfishing is occurring at the gear level, the GS and Fox models were estimated 
for purse seine and other commercial gears. The results of estimation are provided in Table 33. For 
purse seine, the GS model showed better goodness-of-fit while for other gears, the Fox model 
provided superior fit. The coefficients have the right signs. Furthermore, all the coefficients are 
highly significant, implying that at the gear level, overfishing occurs in the commercial fisheries 
sector. 
Ill 
- - - - - - - - - - - -
Table 33. Regression Results for the Gordon-Schaefer and Fox Models for Purse Seine and Other Gears, 1948-94 
Figures in parenthesis are t-values . * means significant at the 1 percent level. 







10.2 Results for Municipal Fisheries 
1 0.2.1 Estimation of the GS and Fox Models for Municipal Fisheries 
The results of the estimation of the GS and Fox models for the municipal fisheries are 
presented in Table 34. As indicated, the latter had a higher adjusted coefficient of multiple 
determination. Both GS and Fox models had the expected signs and significance for the coefficients 
implying that municipal fisheries are overfished. 
1 0.2.2 Maximum Sustainable, Maximum Economic and Open Access Levels in Municipal Fisheries 
For consistency, the GS model again was utilized to estimate the MSY, MEY and OA Y for 
municipal fisheries (Table 35 and 36). The MSY was at 1,058,263 metric tons valued at P29.89 
billion and attained at effort level of 3,823,204 horsepower. Compared with the catch and effort 
levels in Table 25, the MSY in the municipal fisheries was apparently reached in the late eighties 
and early nineties. 
In contrast, the MEY was at 779,824 metric tons valued at P22 billion and attained at the 
effort level of 1 ,862,123 horsepower. Comparing with figures in Table 25, this appeared to have 
been attained back in the early eighties. 
The OAY was at 1,057,554 metric tons valued at P29.87 and achieved at the effort level of 
3,724,246 horsepower. Compared to figures in Table 25, it appeared that this level was apparently 
attained in the early nineties. 
An illustration of the GS model for commercial fisheries is presented in Figure 15. A rather 
unique situation in the municipal fisheries is that the OA Y was attained before the MSY was 
reached, in contrast to the situation in the commercial fisheries. 
1 0.2.3 Economic Rent in Municipal Fisheries 
Tables 35 and 36 also contained the computed total revenues, total costs and economic rents 
using the results of the GS model. If operated at MEY, the maximum economic rent that can be 
derived from the municipal fisheries is about P7.095 billion per year (see Figure 15). If operation 
is at MSY, the economic rent is negative, at P. 77 billion annually. 
At the assumed 1994 average price for municipal fish species of P28,250 per metric ton, the 
maximum economic rent that will be derived from municipal fisheries amounts to 251,047 metric 
tons. 
Again, this result appears consistent with those of previous studies. Recalling back, from 
past studies, the estimated maximum economic rent fi·om the small pelagic and demersal Jisheries 
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Table 34. Regression Results for the Gordon-Schaefer and Fox Models in the Philippine Municipal Fisheries, 1948-94 
Specification (a) Model a1 
Catch = a 1 Effort + a2 Effort2 Gordon-Schaefer .5536* 
(15.420) 
Catch = Effort Exp(a1 + a2 Effort) Fox .3761* 
(5 .202) 
Figures in parenthes is are t-values . * means significant at the 1 percent level. 
(a) Catch and effort are in quantity terms . 
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Maximum Sustainable point 
Maximum Economic Point 
Open Access Point 





Total Revenues Amount of Effort Total Costs 
(Pesos) (horsepower) (Pesos) 
29,895 ,929,282 3 ,823 ,204 30,669,745 ,856 
22 ,030,031,369 1,862 ,123 14,937,950,032 





7,092 ,081 ,338 
0 
- - - - - - - - - -
Tabla 36. Eatlmated Total Ravanuea and Total Coate at Different laval a of Effort In the Philippine Municipal Flaharlaa Ba .. d on the Gordon~Schaafar Model 
Effort Catch Total Revenues Total Costs Economic Rent 
100,000 54 ,636 1,543 ,467 ,000 802,200,000 741 ,267 ,000 
200,000 107,824 3,046,028 ,000 1 ,604 ,400,000 1,441 ,628 ,000 
300,000 159,564 4,507 ,683 ,000 2,406 ,600,000 2, 101 ,063 ,000 
400,000 209 ,856 5,928 ,432.000 3,208 ,800,000 2,719 ,632,000 
500,000 256,700 7,306 ,275,000 4,011 ,000,000 3,297 ,275,000 
600 ,000 306,096 8,647 ,212,000 4,813,200,000 3,834 ,012,000 
700 ,000 352,044 9,945 ,243,000 5,615 ,400,000 4,329 ,843 ,000 
600,000 396,544 1 1 ,202,368,000 6,417 ,600,000 4,784,768 ,000 
900,000 439,596 12,418 ,567 ,000 7,219,800,000 5,198,787 ,000 
1,000,000 481,200 13,593,900,000 8,022,000,000 5,571,900,000 
1,100,000 521 ,356 14 ,728 ,307 ,000 8,824 ,200,000 5,904,107,000 
1,200,000 560,064 15,821 ,806 ,000 9,626,400,000 6,195,406,000 
1,300,000 597,324 16,874 ,403 ,000 10,428,600,000 6,445,803,000 
1,400 ,000 633,136 17,886 ,092,000 11 ,230,800,000 6,655,292,000 
1,500,000 667,500 18,856 ,875 ,000 12,033 ,000,000 6,823,875,000 
1,862 ,1 23 778,824 22,030,032 ,044 14,937 ,850,706 7,092,081 ,338 
1.600.000 700 ,416 19,786,752,000 12,835 ,200,000 6,951 ,552,000 
1,700,000 731 ,884 20,675,723 ,000 13,637 ,400,000 7,038,323,000 
1,600,000 761.904 21 ,523 ,788 ,000 14,439,600,000 7,084 ,188,000 
I- ' I 
1,900,000 790,476 22,330,947 ,000 15,241 ,800,000 7,089,147,000 
..... 2,000,000 817 ,600 23 ,097 ,200,000 16,044 ,000,000 7,053,200 ,000 
Go 2,100,000 843,276 23,822,54 7,000 16,846 ,200,000 6,976 ,347 ,000 
2,200 ,000 867 ,504 24 ,506 ,988,000 17,648,400 ,000 6,858,588,000 
2,300 ,000 890,284 25,150.523,000 18,450,600,000 6,699,923,000 
2,400 ,000 911,616 25,753,152,000 19,252,800,000 6,500,352,000 
2,500 ,000 931 ,500 26,314 ,875,000 20,055,000,000 6,259,875 ,000 
2,600,000 949 ,936 26 ,835,692,000 20 ,857,200 ,000 5,978,492,000 
2,700,000 966,924 27 ,315 ,603,000 21 ,659,400,000 5,656,203 ,000 
2,800,000 982,464 27 ,754 ,608,000 22,461 ,600,000 5,293,008 ,000 
2,900,000 996 ,556 28 ,152,707 ,000 23 ,263 ,800,000 4,888 ,907 ,000 
3,000,000 1,009,200 28 ,509 ,900,000 24 ,066,000,000 4,443 ,900,000 
3,823,204 1,058,263 29,885,829,282 30,669,745,856 (773,816,575) 
3,100,000 1,020,396 28,826 ,187,000 24 ,868,200,000 3,957,987 ,000 
3,200,000 1,030,144 29 ,101,568,000 25,670,400,000 3,431,168,000 
3,300 ,000 1,038,444 29 ,336 ,043,000 26 ,472,600,000 2,863 ,443,000 
3,400 ,000 1,045,296 29 ,529 ,612,000 27 ,274 ,800,000 2,254,812,000 
3,500,000 1,050,700 29 ,682,275,000 28 ,077,000,000 1 ,605,275,000 
3,600 ,000 1,054,656 29 ,794,032,000 28,879,200,000 914,832,000 
3,700,000 1,057 ,164 29 ,864 .883,000 29 ,681,400,000 183,483,000 
3,800,000 1,056,224 29,894 ,828,000 30,483,600,000 (568,772,000) 
3,724,248 1,057,554 29,875,ll00,084 29,875,800,064 0 
3,900,000 1,057,836 29,883 ,867 ,000 31,285,600,000 (1 ,401 ,933 ,000) 





Figure 15. Results of the Estimation of the Gordon-Schaefer 



























fisheries catch was 53 percent, then the municipal fisheries share of the maximum economic rent 
coming from the small pelagic and demersal fisheries was about 280,1 05 metric tons a year. 
While there is no information on the economic rent from large pelagic fisheries, it can be 
assumed that large pelagic species are mostly caught by commercial fishermen. Therefore, the 
extrapolated maximum economic rent of 280, I 05 metric tons for small pelagic and demersal 
fisheries can be taken as the rent for municipal fisheries as a whole. This figure is clearly not way 
off the figure derived by the study. 
I 0.2.4 Required Reduction of Fishing Effort in Municipal Fisheries 
To attain sustainable levels, the fishing effort in municipal fisheries has to be lowered from 
the level of 6,343,329 horsepower in 1994 (Table 25). Percentage-wise, fishing effort will have to 
decrease by 71 percent to attain MEY. To get to the MSY level, on the other hand, it will have to 
be reduced by 40 percent (It should be noted, however, that since MSY falls beyond the OA Y level, 
it is not a desirable management objective in this case). 
I 0.3 Results for Overall Marine Fisheries 
Table 37 presents the results of the estimation of the GS and Fox models for the overall 
marine fisheries sector. It is shown that the former model had a higher adjusted coefficient of 
multiple determination·. Also, both models generated the signs and levels of significance for the 
coefficients which were expected, indicating that overfishing is a problem for the entire marine 
fisheries . 
I 0.3.1 Estimation of the GS and Fox Models for Overall Marine Fisheries 
Table 37 presents the results of the estimation of the GS and Fox models for the overall 
marine lisheries sector. It is shown that the former model had a higher adjusted coefficient of 
multiple determination. Also, both models generated the signs signilicance for the coefficients 
which were expected, implying that the problem of overfishing occurs for marine fisheries as a 
whole (This result, however, is anticipated already given that both the commercial and municipal 
fisheries, its two components, were already found to be overfished earlier). 
I 0.3.2 Maximum Sustainable, Maximum Economic and Open Access Levels in Overall Marine 
Fisheries 
The estimates of the MSY, MEY and OA Y for marine fisheries are provided in Tables 38 
and 39. The MSY was at 1,803,727 metric tons valued at P70.3 billion and arrived at effort level 
of 5,505,882 horsepower. Contrasted to the catch and effort figures in Table 27, the MSY appeared 
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Table 37. Regression Results for the Gordon-Schaefer and Fox Models in the Philippine Marine Fisheries, 1948-94 
Specification (a) Model a1 
Catch = a 1 Effort + a2 Effort2 Gordon-Schaefer .6552* 
(17.054) 
Catch = Effort Exp(a1 + a2 Effort) Fox .3890* 
(6.039) 
Figures in parenthesis are t-values . * means sign ificant at the 1 percent leve l. 
(a) Catch and effort are in quantity terms . 
a2 Adjusted A2 
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Table 38. Key Indicators Using the Gordon-Schaefer Model Results In the Philippine Marine Fisheries, 1994 
Volume of Catch Total Revenues Amount of Effort Total Costs 
Indicator (Metric Tons) (Pesos) (horsepower) (Pesos) 
Maximum Sustainable point 1,803 ,727 70,338,140,386 5 ,505 ,882 66,246,776.4 71 
Maximum Economic Point 1,403,728 54 ,739,791 ,579 2,913,072 35 ,050,078,856 




4 ,091 ,363 ,915 
19,689,712,722 
0 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
T•ble 39. Estlm•ted Total Revenues •nd Total Coate at Different levels of Effort In the Philippine Marine Fisheries Ba•d on the Gordon·Schaefer Modal 
Effort Catch Total Revenues Total Costs Economic Rent 
0 0 0 0 0 
200.000 128,660 5 ,017 ,225 ,360 2,406 .400 ,000 2,610 .825,360 
400 ,000 252,560 9 ,848 ,829 ,760 4 ,812,800,000 5,036 ,029,760 
600,000 371,700 14 ,494 ,813 ,200 7 ,219 ,200,000 7.275 ,613 ,200 
800,000 486,080 18 ,955 .175 ,680 9 ,625 ,600,000 9 ,329 ,575 ,680 
1,000 ,000 595 ,700 23,229 ,917 ,200 12,032.000 ,000 11 ,197 ,917 ,200 
1,200,000 700,560 27 ,319 ,037 .760 14 ,438 ,400,000 12,880 ,637 '760 
1,400,000 800,660 31 ,222.537 ,360 16,844 .800,000 14 ,377 .737 ,360 
1,600,000 896 ,000 34 ,940,416,000 19 ,251 ,200,000 15,689 .216 ,000 
1.800,000 986 ,580 38,472.673 ,680 21,657,600,000 16,815 ,073.680 
2,000,000 1.072,400 41 ,819 ,310.400 24 ,064 ,000,000 17,755 ,310,400 
2,200,000 1,153 ,460 44,980 ,326 ,160 26.470,400,000 18,509 ,926,160 
2.400.000 1,229 ,760 47 ,955 ,720,960 28 .876,800,000 19 ,078 ,920,960 
2,600 ,000 1,301 ,300 50,745,494 ,800 31 ,283 ,200,000 19.462,294 ,800 
2,800 ,000 1,368 ,080 53,349,647 ,680 33 ,689 ,600,000 19,660 ,047,660 
2 ,913,072 1 ,~03 ,728 54,739,791 ,579 35,050,078,856 19,689,712,722 
3 ,000,000 1,430,100 55.768,179,600 36 ,096,000,000 19 ,672,179,600 
3,200,000 1,487 ,360 58 ,001 ,090,560 38 ,502,400,000 19,498 ,690,560 
I 
3,400,000 1,539,860 60,048,380,560 40 ,908,800 ,000 19,139,580,560 ...... 
3,600,000 61 ,910,049,600 43 ,315,200 ,000 N 1,587 ,600 18 ,594 ,849,600 ...... 3 ,800,000 1,630,580 63 ,586,097 ,680 45 ,721 ,600 ,000 17 ,864 ,497,680 
4 ,000,000 1,668,800 65 ,076,524 ,800 48 ,128,000 .000 16 ,948,524 ,800 
4 ,200,000 1,702,260 66 ,381 ,330,960 50,534,400 ,000 15 ,846 ,930,960 
4 ,400,000 1,730,960 67 .500,516,160 52.940,800 ,000 14 ,559,716,160 
4 ,800,000 1,754,900 68 ,434,080,400 55,347 ,200 ,000 13 ,086,880,400 
4 ,800 ,000 1,774 ,080 69 ,182,023,680 57 ' 753,600 ,000 11 ,428,423 ,680 
5 ,000,000 1.788 ,500 69 ,744,346,000 60,160,000 ,000 9 ,584 ,346,000 
5 ,200 ,000 1,798,160 70,121 ,047 ,360 62,566 ,400,000 7 ,554 ,647 ,360 
5 ,400 ,000 1,803,060 70,312,127 .760 64 ,972,800 ,000 5,339,327 ,760 
5 ,505,882 1,803,727 70,338,1 ~0.385 66,2~6 ,776 ,~70 4 ,091 ,363,915 
5 ,800,000 1,803 ,200 70,317 ,587 ,200 67 ,379,200 ,000 2,938,367.200 
5 ,800 ,000 1,798,580 70,137,425 ,680 69 ,765,600,000 351 ,825,680 
5,826,143 1 , 797 ,62~ 70,100,157,71 3 70,100,157,713 (0) 
6 ,000,000 1,789 ,200 69,771 ,643,200 72,192,000,000 (2.420 ,356,800) 
6 ,200,000 1,775 ,060 69 ,220.239,760 74,598,400,000 (5,378 , 160,240) 
6 ,400,000 1,756 ,160 68,483,215.360 77,004,800,000 (8,521 ,584 ,640) 














The MEY was at 1,403,728 metric tons valued at P54.7 billion and generated at the effort 
level of 2,913,072 horsepower. Contrasted to figures in Table 25, was apparently attained in the 
early eighties. 
Lastly, the OAY was at 1,797,624 metric tons valued at P70.1 billion and attained at the 
effort level of 5,826,143 horsepower. Compared to figures in Table 25, this was already reached 
in the early nineties. 
An illustration of the GS model for overall marine fisheries is shown in Figure 16. 
1 0.3.3 Economic Rent in Overall Marine Fisheries 
The computed total revenues, total costs and economic rents using the GS model are also 
shown in Table 38 and 39. At MEY, the maximum economic rent that can be derived from the 
overall marine fisheries is about P 19.689 billion per year. At MSY, the economic rent is at P4.091 
billion annually. 
It can be seen that the generated MEY and MSY levels for the overall marine fisheries divert 
a bit from the sum of the derived MEY and MSY levels for commercial and municipal fisheries 
(Tables 31, 32, 35 and 36). This result, however, is expected given the differences in fish catch and 
fishing effort prices utili zed in the computations. 
At the assumed 1994 average price for marine fish species of P38,996 per metric ton, the 
maximum economic rent that can be had amounts to 504,916 metric tons. Again, this figure is in 
general consistent with those generated from previous studies. 
1 0.3.4 Required Reduction of Fishing Effort in Overall Marine Fisheries 
The above result implies that the fishing effort in overall marine fisheries has to be decreased 
from the level of 8,435,228 horsepower in 1994 (Table 27). In particular, fishing effort will have 
to decrease by 65 percent to attain MEY. On the other hand, it will have to lower by 35 percent to 
attain MSY. 
10.4 Results for Individual Fish Species in Marine Fisheries 
Table 40 presents the results of estimation of the biological models of overfishing for the 35 
most important species in marine fisheries. Only the results of the model that has better fit are 
presented. 
It can be seen that overall, the coefficients of multiple determination were low. This can be 
an indication that both the GS and Fox models, as specified here, may not be the most appropriate 
model for explaining the situation for individual species in marine fisheries (For instance, variables 






Figure 16. Results of the Estimation of the Gordon-Schaefer 










2.9 5.5 5.8 (In Million Horsepower) 

Table 40. Regression Results for the Gordon-Schaefer and Fox Models in the Philippine Marine Fisheries, 
top Species, 1976-87 (Continued) 
I I Species Model a1 a2 Adjusted R2 
I Grouper Gordon-Schaefer .0088* -.000000000748 .56 (7.316) (-2.220) 
I 
Hairtail Gordon-Schaefer .0046 -. 000000000569* .37 
(8.425) (-3 .767) 
I 
Herring Fox .0026* -.00000000575* .45 
(4 .611) (-3.137) 
Indian Mackerel Fox .0137* -.00000000248* .48 
I (6.062) (-3 .300) 
Indo-Pacific Mackerel Fox .0102* -.00000000177* .51 
I (6.664) (-3 .555) 
I 
Lizard Fish Fox .0158* -.00000000356* .71 
(7.807) (-5.322) 
Mullet · Gordon-Schaefer .0031* -. 000000000052 .68 
(4 .644) (.283) 
Porg ies Gordon-Schaefer .0055* -. 000000000583 * .70 
(10.707) (-4 .040) 
Prawn Gordon-Schaefer .0007 -. 0000000000 .44 
(3.143) (- .737) 
Round Scad Fox .0244* -.00000000446* .69 
(9.183) (-5 .104) 
Sardine Fox .0686* -.0000000134* .64 
(7 .694) (-4.576) 
Shrimp Fox .0102* -.00000000191 * .47 
(5 .744) (-3.280) 
Siganid Gordon-Schaefer .0061* -. 000000000634 .47 
(5 .075) (-1 .893) 
I 
I I Skipjack Fox .0222* -. 00000000447* .59 
(6.679) (-4 .130) 
125 
I 
Table 40. Regression Results for the Gordon-Schaefer and Fox Models in the Philippine Marine Fisheries, 
top Species, 1976-87 (Continued) 
I Species Model a 1 a2 Adjusted R2 
I Gordon-Schaefer Slipmouth .0132* -.00000000107 (6.267) (-1.821) .46 
I Snapper Gordon-Schaefer .0074* -.000000000720* (10.582) (-3.689) .77 
Spanish Mackerel Gordon-Schaefer I .0056* -.00000000052 (6.642) (-2.212) .57 
Squid Fox 
I 
.001 0* -.00000000146* 
(9.935) (-4 .594) 
.65 
Treadfin Breams Gordon-Schaefer 
I 
.0108* -.000000000689 
(5.788) (-1 .327) 
.56 
Wh ite Shrimp Fox 
I 
.0101* -.0000000019* 
(5 .744) (-3.280) 
.47 
Yellowfin Tuna Fox .0328* -.00000000606* .67 










as explanatory variables, then, could improve the goodness of fit of the models. Due, however, to 
data and resource constraints, this additional work was not tried in the study). 
Notwithstanding the above, it is clear that overfishing exists when it comes to individual 
marine fish species. In particular, the expected signs and levels of significance were derived for 17 
of the fish species, including anchovies, big-eyed scad, caesio, cavalla, frigate tuna, hairtail, indian 
mackerel, indo-pacific mackerel, lizard fish, porgies, roundscad, sardine, skipjack, snapper, squid, 
white shrimp and yellowfin. From the results, its is also worth noting that tuna and mackerel species 
are among those overtished in the marine fisheries. 
For the rest of the fish species, the results of estimation do not indicate biological 
overfishing. Among the species are prawns which are also produced locally through brackishwater 
aquaculture and highly priced in the international market. 
10.5 Employment Impacts of Reduction in Effort in Marine Fisheries 
A reduction in fishing effort to attain MSY or MEY will raise the productivity of marine 
fisheries. However, it will also cause unemployment to fishermen who will be eased out of fisheries. 
This is a major problem in the country where the rest of the economy may not have enough room 
to accommodate the displaced fishermen. 
While it is difficult to exactly estimate employment effects of a reduction in effort, it was 
attempted here. In Table 41, the results are provided. There are two computational approaches 
used: tirst, by using the previous results for commercial and municipal fisheries individually and 
then summing up and, second, by using the previous results for the overall marine fisheries directly. 
Based on the 1990 figure of about I million total fishermen and fishfarmers and annual 
growth rates of the general population thereafter, the 1994 total fishermen and fishfarmers was 
I, I 03,230. or these, 29 percent or 319,937 were commercial fishermen while 36 percent or 397,163 
were municipal fishermen (see Figure 1 ). 
To attain MSY, effort will be decreased by 12 percent in the commercial fisheries and 40 
percent in the municipal fisheries. If this reduction is applied equally to labor and engine 
horsepower, then commercial fishermen will be reduced by 38,392 while municipal fishermen will 
be lowered by 158,865. In total, using the previous individual results for the commercial and 
municipal fisheries, the number of marine fishermen will decrease by 197,258. 
When results for overall marine fishermen were used, effort will be reduced by 35 percent 
to attain MSY. This means that 250,985 fishermen will lose their jobs (Again, it must be noted that 
computations based on individual and total results differ due to reasons already stated). Getting the 
range, then, about one-fifth to quarter of a million fishermen will be unemployed if MSY is to be 
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Table 41. Estimated Employment Impacts on a Reduction of Fishing Effort to Attain MSY and MEV. 1994 
Maximum Sustainable Yield Maximum Economic Yield 
Percent Current Decrease Percent Current Decrease 
Sector Decrease in Number of in Decrease in Number of in 
Effort Fishermen (a) Employment Effort Fishermen (a) Employment 
Commercial 12 319,937 38,392 45 319,937 143,972 
Municipal 40 397,163 158,865 71 397,163 281 ,986 
Sum 197,258 425,957 
Overall Marine 35 717,100 250,985 65 717,100 466,115 
- ------ - - - - - -
(a) To derive the figures for number of fishermen, general population growth rates from 1990-94 were taken from the NCSO 
"Philippine Statistical Yearbook". Then the 1994 fishermen population was computed based on the growth rates and 
the 1990 figure of 1 million total fishermen. The derived 1994 figure was multiplied by the ratio of commercial and 

















To arrive at MEY, on the other hand, effort must be lowered by 45 percent commercial 
fisheries and by 710 percent in the municipal fisheries. Again, if this reduction is applied equally 
to labor and engine horsepower, then commercial fishermen will be reduced by 143,972 and 
municipal fishermen will be lowered by 281,986 for a sum of 425,957. 
If results for overall marine fishermen were utilized, effort will be lowered by 65 percent to 
get MEY. This means that 466,115 people will be unemployed. Thus, from this and the above 
results, approximately half a million fishem1en will lose work if MSY is to be attained in the marine 
fisheries. 
In brief, a large number of fishermen will lose their jobs if efficiency and sustainabi lity will 
be attained in marine fisheries. Since the country already has a serious unemployment problem, this 





















PART II: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
11.1 Conclusions 
From the results of estimation discussed in the past chapter, the study generated the following 
conclusions about overfishing in the marine fisheries sector: 
a. The marine fisheries sector and its two subsectors, commercial and municipal fisheries are 
already overfished. This sector based finding is consistent with results of previous studies 
employing group of species analysis. 
b. There is also overfishing in the use of specific gears in the commercial fisheries subsector, 




Likewise, there is overfishing in some important marine fish species, including tuna and 
mackerel species. However, there are also species which are not overfished yet, such as 
prawns. 
In general, MEY and MSY levels in the marine fisheries sector and its subsectors have been 
reached during the early eighties to early nineties. 
Substantial economic rents can be had if the marine fisheries sector is operated at sustainable 
levels. Taken separately, if operated at MEY, maximum economic rent from the commercial 
fisheries will be about P 15.205 billion at 1994 prices while that from the municipal fisheries 
will be approximately P7.095 billion. Taken as a whole, the maximum economic rent from 
the marine fisheries sector will be P 19.689 billion. 
f. Substantial reduction in fishing effort will be required to reach sustainable levels in the 
marine fisheries. Considered separately, if operated at MEY, effort in commercial fisheries 
will be decreased by 45 percent while that in the municipal fisheries will be lowered by 71 
percent. Taken as a whole, for marine fisheries, effort must be decreased by 65 percent. 
g. Because of the needed substantial decreases in fishing effort for the attairunent of 
sustainability in the marine fisheries, unemployment will be a serious potential side-effect. 
Taken individually, approximately 144,000 commercial fishermen and 290,000 municipal 
fishermen will lose their jobs if the MEY level is attained in the subsectors. Overall, about 
466,000 marine fishermen will be unemployed. 
Before recommendations can be derived from the aforementioned conclusions, caveats have 



















depend to a large extent on the price offish and cost of effort assumed in the analysis. A decreased 
price of fish or an increased cost of effort, for instance, may substantially reduce the value of the 
estimated economic rent that can be generated from the sector, and vice versa. 
The estimate of price of fish in this study was considered the best estimate in the absence of 
any other source, however. On the other hand, the estimate of the cost of fishing effort may have 
to be changed or updated, based on a recent survey. 
Secondly, it must be mentioned that since some of the annual data, e.g. horsepower in the 
later years and catch in earlier years for the commercial fisheries, were simply estimated, there will 
be concerns as to the reliability and accuracy of the estimated data. The data on effort after 1988, 
in particular, were adjusted upwards to match the overestimated catch data and maintain the trend 
in the catch per unit effort. Suffice it to say here that the particular procedures used in the estimation 
of these data were selected based to a large extent on their usefulness in reducing data inaccuracy. 
Thirdly, the GS and Fox models are partial models in that they only consider fishing effort 
as the factor influencing fish catch. Although in this study, learning (and, hence, in a way 
teclmology), has been imputed as a factor, other determinants offish catch were excluded, such as 
the macroeconomic and sectoral policies or a year long bad weather, for instance. The extent by 
which these factors and other factors influence fishing has not been investigated here. 
Finally, there is the need to disaggregate "other gears" in the commercial fisheries into 
specific gears to see if specific commercial gears likewise endulge in overfishing. There has been 
numerous fishing gears in recent years and their very large number discouraged disaggregation for 
this work. In the future, effort can be made to analyze further overfishing by specific gears, both in 
the commercial and municipal fisheries. 
I 1.2 Recommendations 
11.2.1 Recommendations for Commercial Fisheries 
Based on findings and conclusions for the commercial fisheries subsector, these 
recommendations related to the conservation and further development may be considered: 
a. 
b. 
Since total commercial fisheries are already overlished, then this overexploitation must be 
contained by decreasing fishing effort. Also, since overfishing exists at present, there is the 
immediate need to freeze the fleet level at the least to its current size. A moratorium on the 
issuance of licences to operate is prudent. 
The reduction in fishing effort must he done in such a manner that the costs of reduction (e.g. 
administrative costs, rent seeking costs, etc.) will exceed the gains from the reduction (e.g. 




























Athough theoretically, market-based instruments are known to be superior to command and 
control instruments, the choice of instruments to effect (b) actually have to be a combination 
of both. Furthermore, it will help if the instruments to be used are those that authorities 
already have some experience using. 
The licence system has been enforced in commercial fisheries for some time now although 
the rates have been low to effect any real effort reduction. Because of the experience of the 
fishery authorities in using it, the system may continuously be applied in the future, but at 
much higher rates that will result, at the least partially, to the reduction in fishing effort. 
While commercial fisheries may have a high maximum economic rent computed in this 
study, the actual economic rent it has been enjoying presently is much less given that the 
subsector is operating close to open access equilibrium. So as not to encourage sudden 
dislocation and closure among the commercial fishermen, the licence rates must be set way 
below maximum economic rent initially. 
In addition, the increases in licence rates have to done gradually to allow adjustment among 
the fishermen. In the first year of implementation, for instance, the rates may not be more 
than, say, 20 percent of the final targetted maximum rates for the attainment of sustainability 
levels. Then, the rates can be increased yearly at the same percentage every two years 
thereafter. 
There is doubt, however, that the licencing scheme will be effective in reducing fishing effort 
in the long-term. As earlier discussed, there is the danger that the burder of higher licence 
rates will be transfered by fishermen to the final consumers via imposition of higher prices 
for the catch. 
Over the long-term, then, other measures should be considered by the fishery authorities (see 
e.g. Panayotou 1995; Pearse 1991). A management system similar to the ITQ in New 
Zealand and adjusted to accomodate local conditions, might work here. 
Another management option which can be explored is to impose a restriction on the total 
effort in the commercial fisheries. First, total effort will be lowered gradually to MSY or 
MEY levels based on reduction percentages proposed in this and other studies. The 
reduction can be done in terms of fixed limitations in the number of boats by any acceptable 
composite measure of fishing effort. Then, the right to operate boats will be allocated 
through an open bidding system. Lastly, over time, these rights can be made tradable as in 
the ITQ system. It should be emphasized that a composite measure of the fishing effort is 
necessary to prevent the fishermen from substituting one input for another to circumvent 
limitations. 
The use of the instruments in (d), (h) or (i) must be coupled with strong reforms in the 




















commercial operators using unlicenced duplicate boats) must be curtailed. Penalizing the 
offenders strictly according to law is likewise a necessity. 
The problem of fishermen transfering the increased burden of the tax to the consumers ie 
real. [fthey can actually do this, it will be doubly difficult to reduce fishing effort. A way 
of so lving thi s problem may be to strictly enforce some price controls, specifically in the 
wholesale market of fish. On the other hand , because of its high cost of administration and 
it being a hindrance to the operation of a free market, the use of price controls will need 
serious investigation. 
I. Lastl y, the problem of diplaced commercial fishermen once an effective effort reducing 
management scheme is in place will be a matter of serious concern. As many fishermen are 
uni-sk illed, it will be difficult to employ the displaced in other economic sectors. Hence, a 
retraining and employment program will be needed. An option will be for the national 
government and private sector, e.g. Chamber of Fisheries, to pool their resources together 
to organize such a program. 
11 .2.2 Recommendations for Municipal Fisheries 
For the municipal fisheries subsector, the following are the recommendations: 
a. As overli shing also exists in the municipal fisheries, there is also the need to reduce from its 




An iso lated policy to simply lower effort, however, through effort limitation for instance, 
will be politically difficult to implement. This is because municipal fishing is largely 
subsistence in nature and a matter of survival to fishermen. Forcing the fishermen out 
without an acceptable accompanying program to economically relocate them will be 
inequitable and morally unacceptable. 
Because of (b), it may only be through the explicit provision of alternative livelihood 
opportunities to them that fi shermen can leave the fishery. To effect this, small-scale 
livelihood programs can be promoted by the government in coastal areas in cooperation with 
the local government units and non-government organizations. Naturally, these livelihood 
promotion efforts will be accompanied by credit and training programs, and thus requires 
substantial public investment. 
The promotion of econ-tourism in suited rural coastal areas is another way of promoting 
alternative livelihood opportunities for municipal fishermen. The more fishermen employed 
in the econ-tourism establishments, the less fishing effort will be. In addition, because of 














e. Another option tor the government is to encourage dispersion of industrial development into 
the rural coastal areas. The more industries and other economic activities that employ the 
municipal fishermen, the less likely that they will endulge in fishing activities. In addition, 
rural industrial development provides impetus for rural economic growth in general. 
f. The promotion of the practice of coastal resources management in fishing communities is 
another means of reducing fishing effort. As municipal fishermen become aware of the 
dangers that overfishing brings to their economic welfare, the more likely they will practice 
sustainable fishins. The growing number of coastal resources management programs or 
projects in the country is a big step in the right direction and must be continuously supported 
by the government. 
g. Finally, the fast implementation and operationalization of the Local Government Code in 
rural coastal areas will help promote effort reduction in municipal fisheries. As the code 
empowers local governments and people organizations to manage coastal resources in a 
sustainable manner, its actual implementation should result to the development by the local 
stakeholders of effective systems, such as those relating to coastal property rights and access; 
rules and ordinances; monitoring, policing and enforcement; penalties; and others that will 
result to the sustainable exploitation of municipal fishery resources. 




For overall marine fisheries , the following recommendations may be considered: 
As stated in the early parts of the study, overfishing in the marine fisheries has been brought 
about not only by increased fishing effort but also by the employment of destructive gears 
and techniques by fishermen. Hence, to help conserve marine fisheries resources, the 
effective enforcement of the fishery laws, rules and regulations related to destructive gears 
must be strengthened. In addition, new and more effective ways of countering the problem, 
such as deputization of stakeholders in local areas, must be extensively practiced. 
While reduction of fishing effort is a primary concern in the marine fisheries, the impacts of 
such reduction in terms of equity must be given equal attention by the authorities. This point 
was already discussed for the municipal fisheries. For the overall marine fisheries , it is 
strongly recommended that a strong balance between efficiency and equity objectives must 
first be established before reduction in effort will be done. If in the end, for instance, a 
reduction will only result to the monopolization of the fisheries sector by a few efficient big-
time operators, then sustainable development in the sector will have been attained at too stiff 
a pnce. 
It is also strongly recommended that public revenues that will be had from fishing effort 
reduction be specifically earmarked fo r the development of the marine fisheries sector. This 



















Furthermore, more public funded projects in marine fisheries means that the government is 
now putting its money where its mouth is. 
d. In relation to (c), public revenues from effort reduction can be specifically utilized to assist 
the fishermen that will be displaced by the reduction. The funds can go into training 
programs or the development of alternative livelihoods for the fishermen mentioned earlier. 
e. As indicated in this study, there may be several commercially important fish species that are 
underexploited at the present. Thus, the authorities should put as much effort into how these 
species can be exploited as to how overfished species can be protected. The optimal 
exploitation of all commercial species must be a prime goal in fishery management. 
r. Lastly, all this talk about overfishing brings in the question of who are doing all the 
overlishing. Are the Filipinos the only ones doing the overfishing or are there others 
illegally overfishing in its waters? This point is crucial because any effort to curve 
overfishing by locals will be ineffective, and nationally inimical, if overfishing by others 
remain. While this is outside the scope of this study, it must be emphasized here that the 
problem of instrusion by foreign fishermen into local fishing grounds must be solved if the 
marine fisheries resources are to be sustainably managed. 
To end, this stu<:'y concludes that at this point in fisheries development, serious fishing effort 
reduction must be done if our marine fisheries resources are to last. However, the objective of 
sustainable development in fisheries must not be attained at the exorbitant price of imposing 
inequitous burden on poor populations who were forced by economic realities to hitch their lives on 
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